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CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE CHURCH OF 
THE TWELVE STEPS 
George J. Barry* 
INTRODUCTION 
Every state in the nation, as well as the U.S. territories of 
Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, currently recognizes a 
need to protect the confidential communications between a person 
and his or her spiritual advisor.1 With no basis in state common 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2003; B.A., University of South 
Florida, 2000. The author would like to thank the staff of the Journal of Law 
and Policy. He would also like to thank his family, especially his wife Tracy, 
for their love and support. 
1 State statutes designating specific religious leaders to whom the 
religious privilege applies seem unavailing in light of courts’ expanding view 
of the type of organizations that qualify as a religion or a religious 
organization. See, e.g., Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 
1068, 1075 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that Alcoholics Anonymous is a religious 
organization for the purpose of applying the Establishment Clause). The 
variations range from the vague, “[a] member of the clergy or other minister 
of any religion,” MINN. STAT. § 595.02 (2001), to the exclusive, “any 
Protestant minister of the Gospel, any priest of the Roman Catholic faith, any 
priest of the Greek Orthodox Catholic faith, any Jewish rabbi, or to any 
Christian or Jewish minister,” GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (2001), to the 
commendable, but laughable, “minister of the gospel, priest of the Catholic 
Church, rector of the Episcopal Church, ordained rabbi, or regular minister of 
religion of any religious organization or denomination usually referred to as a 
church,” TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (2001). 
 The term “spiritual advisor” is commonly used in the privilege statutes to 
describe the job of the sacerdotal functionaries of the various religions. See 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 2001). For example, the New York statute 
states, “Unless the person confessing or confiding waives the privilege, a 
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law,2 this recognition has assumed statutory form,3 creating what 
                                                          
clergyman, or other minister of any religion or duly accredited Christian 
Science practitioner, shall not be allowed to disclose a confession or 
confidence made to him in his professional character as spiritual advisor.” Id. 
(emphasis added). This note, therefore, adopts the term “spiritual advisor” to 
be used interchangeably with “clergy” to represent the person performing a 
particular spiritual service within the context of a religious organization that 
recognizes that person as one capable of performing such services. 
2 See, e.g., Keenan v. Gigante, 390 N.E.2d 1151, 1154 (N.Y. 1979) 
(noting that the privilege did not exist at common law and holding that 
communications between a prisoner and a priest are not protected by statutory 
privilege when the testimony of the priest would not “jeopardize the 
atmosphere of confidence and trust which allegedly enveloped the 
relationship” between the priest and the communicant); Claudia G. Catalano, 
Annotation, Subject Matter and Waiver of Privilege Covering Communications 
to Clergy Member or Spiritual Adviser, 93 A.L.R.5th 327 (2001) (noting that 
state courts have unanimously acknowledged that the religious privilege did 
not exist at common law). 
3 ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (2001); ALASKA R. EVID. 506 (Michie 2001); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2233 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Michie 
2001); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1033 (providing privilege to penitent) (Deering 
2001), 1034 (providing privilege to clergy) (Deering 2001); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 13-90-107 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146b (2001); DEL. R. 
EVID. 505 (2001); FLA. STAT. ch. 90.505 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 
(2001); 6 GUAM CODE ANN. § 503 (2001); HAW. R. EVID. 506 (2001); IDAHO 
CODE § 9-203 (Michie 2001); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803 (2001); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 34-46-3-1 (Michie 2001); IOWA CODE § 622.10 (2001); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (2001); KY. R. EVID. 505 (Michie 2001); LA. CODE 
EVID. ANN. art. 511 (West 2001); ME. R. EVID. 505 (West 2001); MD. CODE 
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, 
§ 20A (West 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2156 (2001); MINN. STAT. § 
595.02 (2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (2001); MO. REV. STAT. § 
491.060 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 
(2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.255 (Michie 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 516:35 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West 2001); N.M. R. 
EVID. § 11-506 (Michie 2001); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 2001); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (2001); N.D. R. EVID. 505 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2317.02 (Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 2505 (2001); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 40.260 (2001); PA. CONS. STAT. § 5943 (2001); P.R. R. EVID. 
28 (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 
(Law. Co-op. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-17 (Michie 2001); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (2001); TEX. EVID. CODE ANN. § 505 (2001); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (2001); VT. R. EVID. 505 (2001); 4 V.I. CODE ANN. § 
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is commonly referred to as the “priest-penitent,”4 “clergy-
penitent,”5 or simply “religious”6 privilege. The federal 
government also recognizes a religious privilege. Declining to 
codify the privilege explicitly,7 Congress instead adopted Federal 
                                                          
857 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie 2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 
5.60.060 (2001); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-9 (2001); WIS. STAT. § 905.06 (2001); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101 (Michie 2001). 
4 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-266 (2001). 
5 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 622.10 (2001). 
6 See, e.g., DEL. R. EVID. 505 (2001). 
7 The Supreme Court proposed a statutory privilege to Congress as 
Federal Rule of Evidence 506, which failed to pass. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 
& KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 26 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
5611 (1992). The rule stated the following: 
a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) A “clergyman” is a minister, priest, rabbi, or other similar 
functionary of a religious organization, or an individual reasonably 
believed so to be by the person consulting him. 
(2) A communication is “confidential” if made privately and not 
intended for further disclosure except to other persons present in 
furtherance of the purpose of the communication. 
b) General rule of privilege. A person has a privilege to refuse to 
disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential 
communication by the person to a clergyman in his professional 
character as spiritual adviser. 
c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the 
person, by his guardian or conservator, or by his personal 
representative if he is deceased. The clergyman may claim the 
privilege on behalf of the person. His authority so to do is presumed 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH SUPREME COURT ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE REPORT, HR 5463 JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, AND 
AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 84  
(John R. Schmertz, Jr., ed., 1974) [hereinafter PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF 
EVIDENCE]. When proposed Rule 506 was before Congress for a vote, it 
foundered without much debate; however, while in the drafting stages, 
Arkansas Senator John L. McClellan (D) submitted a letter objecting to the 
proposed rule’s broad definition of clergyman. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra, § 
5611. In response to his objections, which are thought by some to have been 
motivated by racism, the advisory committee altered the language of its note 
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Rule of Evidence 501, which enables the federal judiciary to 
create evidentiary privileges “in the light of reason and 
experience.”8 Although Rule 501 prompted expeditious 
development of a religious privilege,9 the federal judiciary had 
                                                          
following the text of the rule to narrow the application of the privilege. Id.  
The note reads in pertinent part: 
[I]t is not so broad as to include all self-denominated “ministers.” A 
fair construction of the language requires that the person to whom the 
status is sought to be attached be regularly engaged in activities 
conforming at least in a general way with those of a Catholic priest, 
Jewish rabbi, or minister of an established Protestant denomination, 
though not necessarily on a full-time basis. 
PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra, at 84-85; see also In re 
Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 385 n.13 (adopting rejected Rule 
506’s definition of clergy and limiting the privilege in a similar fashion). 
Ultimately, Congress rejected Rule 506, along with seven other specific 
evidentiary privileges, including the attorney-client privilege, psychotherapist-
patient privilege, and “husband-wife” privilege, and three general rules 
proposed by the Court. See generally PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF 
EVIDENCE, supra. 
8 FED. R. EVID. 501 (2002). Rule 501, enacted in 1974, states the 
following: 
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States 
or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme 
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, 
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be 
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be 
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason 
and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with 
respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law 
supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, 
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be 
determined in accordance with State law. 
Id.  
9 United States v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1973) (interpreting 
proposed Rule 506 to determine that a member of the clergy must be a natural 
person and not a corporation); In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 436 (C.D. 
Cal. 1971) (determining that non-ordained counselors, recruited by a minister 
who was ordained by the United Presbyterian Church and was employed to 
counsel students about the Vietnam War draft, fell within the definition of 
clergy under proposed Rule 506). 
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already recognized the privilege, or a variation thereof, long 
before Congress had addressed the issue.10 
Of the various evidentiary privileges in existence (e.g., 
attorney-client, doctor-patient, and psychotherapist-patient), the 
religious privilege has been the least controversial and most 
widely accepted.11 Nevertheless, the privilege has not been 
entirely free from controversy, and it has evolved through the 
relatively sparse caselaw on both the state and federal levels to 
protect communications meeting three general requirements:12 (1) 
the person communicating with her spiritual advisor must do so 
with a reasonable expectation of confidentiality;13 (2) the spiritual 
advisor must be, or reasonably be thought by the communicant to 
                                                          
10 See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (stating that 
public policy would not permit at trial the disclosure of the “confidences of the 
confessional”); McMann v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 
1937) (recognizing “penitential” communications as privileged). 
11 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 381 (“The 
history of the proposed Rules of Evidence reflects that the clergy-communicant 
rule was one of the least controversial of the enumerated privileges, merely 
defining a long-recognized principle of American law.”); JOHN HENRY 
WIGMORE, 5 A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN 
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2396 (2d ed. 1923) (noting that Jeremy Bentham, 
“the greatest opponent of privileges,” supported the religious privilege). 
12 Some opinions have recognized a fourth requirement, that the 
communication be penitential or confessional in nature, as may be required by 
the ecclesiastical doctrine of a particular religion. See, e.g., People v. 
Edwards, 248 Cal. Rptr. 53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that confidential 
communication between criminal defendant and Episcopalian priest was not 
privileged when not of a penitential nature); State v. Buss, 887 P.2d 920 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (“Washington’s statutory privilege only applies if 
Buss’ statements were a confession in the course of discipline enjoined by the 
church.” (internal citations and ellipsis omitted)). This requirement is largely 
rejected by more recent decisions; courts have expanded the privilege to apply 
broadly to communication reasonably expected to remain confidential. See, 
e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 386 (noting that the religious 
privilege has evolved from protecting private confessions to encompassing a 
wide range of communications with clergy); State v. Martin, 975 P.2d 1020 
(Wash. 1999) (abrogating Buss, 887 P.2d 920). 
13 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 386 (holding that the 
presence of a third party does not defeat the reasonable expectation of privacy 
when the third party is necessary for the furtherance of the communication). 
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be,14 a member of the clergy;15 and (3) the spiritual advisor must 
be acting in his or her professional capacity.16 
Courts have addressed, though not fully answered, questions 
regarding each of these requirements.17 The least litigated issue is 
what qualifications are necessary to be considered a spiritual 
advisor as required by state statutes and federal courts.18 In most 
cases, a person’s status as spiritual advisor is assumed.19 This 
assumption likely stems from a common understanding that most 
people claiming the privilege are attempting to protect 
information revealed to recognized leaders of widely accepted 
religions.20 Thus, courts need only address this issue when the 
                                                          
14 Most statutes granting the religious privilege protect communicants 
who may have been misled into believing the person with whom they were 
communicating was a spiritual advisor to whom the privilege applied. See, 
e.g., IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Michie 2001); N.M. R. EVID. § 11-506 (Michie 
2001); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 2001). 
15 See In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 436 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (invoking 
the religious privilege to protect speech between college students and 
counselors providing spiritual counseling during the Vietnam War draft when 
the counselors had been appointed by an ordained minister of the United 
Presbyterian Church working as a college chaplain). 
16 See United States v. Gordon, 493 F. Supp. 822, 823 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) 
(holding communication with a priest acting in the capacity of a member of a 
corporation’s board of directors not privileged); State v. Barber, 346 S.E.2d 
441, 445 (N.C. 1986) (finding that a de facto clergyman was not acting in 
professional capacity during a casual conversation with a friend). 
17 See generally In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374 
(determining whether communication with a clergy member was confidential 
when in the presence of a third party); see also Gordon, 493 F. Supp. at 823 
(holding that a priest was not acting in his “spiritual capacity” when discussing 
business matters with the defendant); In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. at 436 
(noting that, while ordination might not be required for a person to qualify as 
a clergy member, “the person to whom the status is sought to be attached 
[must] be regularly engaged in activities conforming at least in a general way 
with those of . . . an established Protestant denomination, though not 
necessarily on a full-time basis”) (citing proposed Rule 506 advisory 
committee’s note). 
18 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5613. 
19 Id. 
20 Despite the recognition and acceptance of numerous religions within 
the United States, the majority of statutes creating the religious privilege 
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status of the spiritual advisor is tenuous at best.21 
In Cox v. Miller,22 the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York squarely addressed the issue of 
who qualifies as a spiritual advisor.23 The court found that New 
York’s religious privilege shields communications within the self-
help setting of Alcoholics Anonymous (“A.A.”),24 and its 
reasoning will likely protect communication within numerous 
organizations adopting A.A.’s hugely successful “Twelve Steps” 
to recovery.25 In its opinion, the court explicitly determined that 
A.A. members are spiritual advisors as that term is used and 
                                                          
identify spiritual advisors as “clergy” or “clergymen” and limit their explicit 
definition of those terms to ministers, priests, and rabbis. See, e.g., ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Michie 2001). This note assumes the lists of 
statutorily denoted religious leaders are not exhaustive. The few cases 
discussing the issue support such an assumption. Compare Reutkemeier v. 
Nolte, 161 N.W. 290, 293 (Iowa 1917) (holding that elders of a Presbyterian 
church constituted clergy), with Rutledge v. State, 525 N.E.2d 326, 328 (Ind. 
1988) (holding that a member of the Gideons, a religious organization of 
business people who hand out free Bibles, who was teaching prisoners about 
the Bible was not clergy). Furthermore, this note proposes to expose the 
privilege’s limitations when a person’s status as a spiritual advisor is suspect. 
21 See, e.g., Eckmann v. Bd. of Educ., 106 F.R.D. 70, 72-73 (E.D. Mo. 
1985) (holding that a nun who was recognized by the Catholic Church as 
holding the position of “spiritual director” was clergy for privilege purposes); 
Manous v. State, 407 S.E.2d 779, 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a 
psychic was not a clergy member regardless of any self-characterization as a 
spiritual advisor); State v. Alspach, 524 N.W.2d 665, 668 (Iowa 1994) 
(holding that the defendant failed to prove his brother was a member of the 
clergy despite his view that his brother was a spiritual advisor); Rutledge, 525 
N.E.2d at 328 (holding that a member of the Gideons was not clergy). 
22 154 F. Supp. 2d 787 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
23 See infra Part I.C (discussing Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787). 
24 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 2001). 
25 According to the most recent information released by A.A., as of Jan. 
1, 2002, its membership comprised 100,766 groups containing a total of more 
than 2,000,000 individuals, with approximately 1,162,112 members in the 
United States. Alcoholics Anonymous, Membership, at http://www.alcoholics-
anonymous.org/english/E_FactFile/M-24_d4.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2002). 
A.A. acknowledges that the strictures of anonymity and the general lack of 
formal organization complicate attempts to maintain accurate statistical 
records. Id. 
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defined in the statute.26 In so doing, the court extended both the 
New York statutory privilege and the federal common law 
privilege beyond what “the light of reason and experience”27 
could ever possibly have revealed. 
Part I of this note includes a discussion of the formation of 
A.A. and the judicial recognition of A.A. as a religious 
organization.28 In addition, Part I briefly introduces the Cox 
decision.29 Part II explores the Cox reasoning in depth, revealing 
the factual and legal flaws pervading the court’s decision. These 
flaws help bring to light two primary reasons why the religious 
privilege, absent legislative approval, has no place in the A.A. 
setting: (1) despite its designation as a religious organization, 
A.A. does not fit within the framework of the religious privilege; 
and (2) public policy cannot endorse a judiciary willing to put the 
addiction recovery interests of a criminal confessor above those 
of his or her fellow recovering confidant. Part III addresses the 
concerns of the critics who support expanding the religious 
privilege to encompass A.A. and demonstrates that their 
arguments are replete with speculation and unsupported by 
                                                          
26 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 2001). 
27 FED. R. EVID. 501 (2001). 
28 Currently, the Second and Seventh Circuits are the only federal circuits 
to have recognized A.A. or groups adopting A.A.’s principles as religious 
organizations for the purpose of determining whether the Establishment Clause 
permits the government to compel attendance at those organizations’ meetings. 
See Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(discussed infra Part I.B); Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that Narcotics Anonymous is a religious organization). The issue, 
therefore, is far from settled and beyond the scope of this note. Nevertheless, 
the author accepts the Second and Seventh Circuits’ conclusion, which has 
been welcomed by some commentators. See, e.g., Derek P. Apanovitch, 
Note, Religion and Rehabilitation: The Requisition of God by the State, 47 
DUKE L.J. 785 (1998) (discussing the various religious aspects of A.A.); 
Rachel F. Calabro, Note, Correction Through Coercion: Do State Mandated 
Alcohol and Drug Treatment Programs in Prisons Violate the Establishment 
Clause?, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 565 (1998) (arguing that A.A.’s adoption of 
traditional religious concepts qualifies the organization for Establishment 
Clause protection). 
29 Cox v. Miller, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
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science.30 This note concludes that protecting communication 
within A.A. by expanding religious privileges, an extreme 
solution for a virtually non-existent problem, is unnecessary in 
light of the protection provided by the Free Exercise Clause of 
the United States Constitution.31 
I.  ESTABLISHING THE CHURCH OF THE RECOVERING ALCOHOLIC 
A.A. takes no official position on public issues.32 Despite 
being the subject of several court opinions, A.A. has adhered to 
this principle and has refrained from issuing an official statement 
challenging or praising the judicial portrayals or the 
consequences arising therefrom.33 In order to understand A.A., it 
is, therefore, necessary to explore the history and principles 
guiding the development and survival of what is arguably the 
world’s largest self-help organization.34 Following a discussion of 
                                                          
30 See generally Thomas J. Reed, The Futile Fifth Step: Compulsory 
Disclosure of Confidential Communications Among Alcoholics Anonymous 
Members, 70 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 693 (discussing various rationales, including 
the expansion of the religious privilege, for protecting confidential speech 
within A.A.); Jessica G. Weiner, Comment, “And the Wisdom to Know the 
Difference”: Confidentiality vs. Privilege in the Self-Help Setting, 144 U. PA. 
L. REV. 243 (1995) (arguing in favor of an evidentiary privilege to protect 
speech within A.A.); see also infra Part III (discussing critics’ views). 
31 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
32 See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVICES, INC., TWELVE STEPS 
AND TWELVE TRADITIONS 176 (soft-cover edition 1981) [hereinafter TWELVE 
STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS] (stating, as A.A.’s tenth tradition, 
“Alcoholics Anonymous has no opinion on outside issues; hence the A.A. 
name ought never be drawn into public controversy”). 
33 Id. (“As by some deep instinct, we A.A.’s have known from the very 
beginning that we must never, no matter what the provocation, publicly take 
sides in any fight, even a worthy one.”); see also Jim Fitzgerald, Judge Voids 
Manslaughter Conviction, AP ONLINE, Aug. 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL 
25489398 (stating that an A.A. spokesman said that A.A. would not comment 
on the Cox decision); Frank J. Murray, Courts Hit Sentencing DWIs to A.A., 
Fault Religious Basis, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1996, at A10, available at 1996 
WL 2970041 (stating that A.A. would not comment on various courts’ 
opinions finding that the organization was religion-based). 
34 See supra note 25 (noting A.A.’s size in terms of members). 
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A.A.’s history is a description of the Second Circuit opinion that 
designated A.A. a religious organization and an introduction to 
the case that inspired this note. 
A.  Alcoholics Anonymous: Laying the Groundwork  
Although its history extends back before its official creation,35 
A.A.’s present-day roots began to form when Bill Wilson met 
Dr. Bob Smith; both were professionals desperately seeking 
refuge from alcoholism.36 Together, applying principles adopted 
from other recovery groups, they began to create what would 
become A.A.’s doctrinal foundation.37 Dr. Smith and Mr. Wilson 
oversaw the establishment of three A.A. groups, one located in 
Akron, another in Cleveland, and the third in New York City.38 
Central to the groups’ existence was the belief that the members 
needed to (1) acknowledge a lack of control over their lives and 
their alcohol problem, (2) recognize that they were at the lowest 
point in their lives, (3) turn their lives over to a “higher 
power,”39 and (4) believe that these steps would eventually lead 
to a life of sobriety.40 These four core beliefs evolved into the 
now-popular “Twelve Steps,”41 first published in the 1939 book 
                                                          
35 See Reed, supra note 30, at 708-14 (discussing, inter alia, the history 
of A.A.). 
36 See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVICES, INC., ALCOHOLICS 
ANONYMOUS, xv-xvii (3d ed. 2001) [hereinafter ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS]. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 25. 
40 See Reed, supra note 30, at 708-14 (discussing, inter alia, the history 
of A.A.). 
41 TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 5-9. 
A.A.’s Twelve Steps are as follows: 
1. We admitted we were powerless over alcohol—that our lives had 
become unmanageable. 
2. Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore 
us to sanity. 
3. Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of 
God as we understood him. 
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“Alcoholics Anonymous,”42 which were meant as suggestions for 
alcoholics trying to recover.43 In 1950, A.A.’s organizers 
adopted the “Twelve Traditions”44 as principles guiding the 
                                                          
4. Made a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves. 
5. Admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human being the 
exact nature of our wrongs. 
6. Were entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of 
character. 
7. Humbly asked Him to remove our shortcomings. 
8. Made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became willing to 
make amends to them all. 
9. Made direct amends to such people wherever possible, except 
when to do so would injure them or others. 
10. Continued to take personal inventory and when we were wrong 
promptly admitted it. 
11. Sought through prayer and meditation to improve our conscious 
contact with God as we understood him, praying only for knowledge 
of His will for us and the power to carry that out. 
12. Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these steps, we 
tried to carry this message to alcoholics, and to practice these 
principles in all our affairs. 
Id. 
42 ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 36. 
43 Id. at 59. 
44 See TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 9-13. 
A.A.’s Twelve Traditions are as follows: 
1. Our common welfare should come first; personal recovery depends 
upon A.A. unity. 
2. For our group purpose there is but one ultimate authority—a loving 
God as He may express Himself in our group conscience. Our leaders 
are but trusted servants; they do not govern. 
3. The only requirement for A.A. membership is a desire to stop 
drinking. 
4. Each group should be autonomous except in matters affecting other 
groups or A.A. as a whole. 
5. Each group has but one primary purpose—to carry its message to 
the alcoholic who still suffers. 
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organization itself.45 While the founders intended the Twelve 
Steps to guide an individual member to recovery, the Twelve 
Traditions served to guide an individual in contributing to A.A.’s 
overall success and survival.46 They were not, however, 
established or subsequently interpreted as a strict set of rules.47 
Rather, like the Twelve Steps, the Twelve Traditions were 
unenforceable guidelines for the individual members whose own 
interests A.A. was meant to serve.48 
We believe there isn’t a fellowship on earth which 
lavishes more devoted care upon its individual members; 
surely there is none which more jealously guards the 
individual’s right to think, talk, and act as he wishes. No 
A.A. can compel another to do anything; nobody can be 
punished or expelled. Our Twelve Steps to recovery are 
                                                          
6. An A.A. group ought never endorse, finance, or lend the A.A. 
name to any related facility or outside enterprise, lest problems of 
money, property, and prestige divert us from our primary purpose. 
7. Every A.A. group ought to be fully self-supporting, declining 
outside contributions. 
8. Alcoholics Anonymous should remain forever nonprofessional, but 
our service centers may employ special workers. 
9. A.A., as such, ought never be organized; but we may create 
service boards or committees directly responsible to those they serve. 
10. Alcoholics Anonymous has no opinion on outside issues; hence 
the A.A. name ought never be drawn into public controversy. 
11. Our public relations policy is based on attraction rather than 
promotion; we need always maintain personal anonymity at the level 
of press, radio and films. 
12. Anonymity is the spiritual foundation of all our traditions, ever 
reminding us to place principles before personalities. 
Id. 
45 Id. at 18. 
46 Id. at 129; see also ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 36, at xix 
(describing the rationale that led to the adoption of the Twelve Traditions as 
the need to develop “principles by which the A.A. groups and A.A. as a 
whole could survive and function effectively”). 
47 TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 129. 
48 Id. 
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suggestions; the Twelve Traditions which guarantee 
A.A.’s unity contain not a single “Don’t.” They 
repeatedly say “We ought . . .” but never “You Must!”49 
B. Problematic Reasoning Spawns a Religion 
A.A. views itself as a secular organization.50 It is not 
affiliated with, nor does it endorse, any religion or religious 
group.51 Indeed, theists and atheists can apply A.A.’s 
principles.52 Regardless, the judicial community has begun 
viewing A.A. as a religious organization.53 
                                                          
49 Id. 
50 See, e.g., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 36, at xx (“Alcoholics 
Anonymous is not a religious organization.”); 44 Questions, pamphlet P-2, at 
19 (Alcoholics Anonymous World Services, Inc., 1952) (“A.A. is not a 
religious society.”); This is AA, pamphlet P-1, at 7 (Alcoholics Anonymous 
World Service, Inc., 1984)  (“We are not reformers, and we are not allied 
with any group, cause, or religious denomination.”). 
51 See supra note 44 (stating A.A.’s sixth tradition). 
52 See TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 27 
(“You can, if you wish, make A.A. itself your higher power.”). 
53 See, e.g., Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 101-05 (N.Y. 1996) 
(holding that a prison requiring inmates to attend a rehabilitation program that 
incorporated A.A. and N.A. in order to receive various benefits constituted an 
excessive entanglement in religion); In re Garcia, 24 P.3d 1091, 1094 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2001) (holding that A.A.’s religious content precludes the 
government from coercing an inmate to attend A.A. meetings). It is not clear 
whether courts adopting this view have technically designated A.A. as a 
religion, as opposed to simply a secular organization incorporating spiritual 
ideals into its suggestions for achieving sobriety. For example, in Warner v. 
Orange County Dep’t of Prob. the Second Circuit refers to A.A.’s “substantial 
religious component,” 115 F.3d 1068, 1070 (2d Cir. 1996), “religion-infused 
meetings,” id. at 1074, and “religious exercises,” id. at 1075. The court also 
referred to A.A. as a “religious program,” id., and describes A.A. meetings 
as “intensely religious events.” Id. Additionally, the Warner court 
distinguished between A.A. meetings and a public school offering a 
commencement prayer. Id. at 1076. A subsequent Second Circuit case 
interpreted Warner as having characterized A.A. as a religion. See DeStefano 
v. Emergency Hous. Group, 247 F.3d 397, 407 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding the 
district court’s finding, which was based on Warner, that A.A. is “a religion 
for Establishment Clause purposes”) (internal quotations omitted). The Cox 
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Most cases holding that A.A. is a religious organization 
involve a prisoner or probationer bringing suit on the grounds 
that the government required him or her to attend A.A. 
meetings54 or meetings of other recovery programs adopting 
                                                          
court shared this view. Cox v. Miller, 154 F. Supp. 2d. 787, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (“Our Court of Appeals has subsequently held in the context of an 
Establishment Clause case that A.A. is a religion . . . .”). This note accepts, 
for now, the Cox court’s interpretation, but utilizes the term “religious 
organization” when referring to A.A. 
 Presently, not all courts addressing the issue agree that A.A. is a religious 
organization. See, e.g., Boyd v. Coughlin, 914 F. Supp. 828, 833 (N.D.N.Y. 
1996) (“The mere reference to spirituality, or the use of terms that may be 
commonly associated with religion, without more, cannot change the character 
of A.A. or N.A. . . . from that of aiming to treat chemically dependent 
individuals to that of advancing or inhibiting religion as a principal or primary 
purpose.”); Jones v. Smid, No. 4-89-CV-20857, 1993 WL 719562, at *4 
(S.D. Iowa, Apr. 29, 1993) (holding that A.A.’s religious content does not 
transform it into a religious organization); Salaam v. Collins, 830 F. Supp. 
853, 863 (D. Md. 1993) (classifying A.A. as a “secular self-help . . . 
organization[]”); Stafford v. Harrison, 766 F. Supp. 1014, 1016-17 (D. Kan. 
1991) (holding that A.A.’s spiritual content and reference to a “Higher 
Power” are not sufficient to deem A.A. a religion; therefore, requiring an 
inmate to attend meetings of program based on A.A. did not violate the 
Establishment Clause); Youle v. Edgar, 526 N.E.2d 894, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1988) (dismissing an argument that A.A. is a “quasi-religious organization,” 
noting that “[t]he primary function of Alcoholics Anonymous is to cope with 
the disease of alcoholism”); State v. Boobar, 637 A.2d 1162, 1169-70 (Me. 
1994) (holding that the religious privilege is inapplicable to A.A. 
communication). 
 In addition, some opinions raise the issue but fail to reach a definitive 
decision. See O’Connor v. State, 855 F. Supp. 303, 307-08 (C.D. Cal. 1994) 
(noting A.A.’s “religious overtones” but never making clear whether the court 
viewed A.A. as a religious organization for Establishment Clause purposes, 
emphasizing that the “‘principal and primary effect’ of encouraging 
participation in A.A. is not to advance religious belief but to treat substance 
abuse”) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)). 
54 DeStefano represents the exception. 247 F.3d 397. This case was 
brought in the Second Circuit after Warner, which initially deemed A.A. a 
religious organization. See Warner, 115 F.3d 1068. The plaintiff in 
DeStefano, then mayor of Middletown, N.Y., sued as a taxpayer on the 
grounds that the state was funding a private alcoholic treatment facility that 
incorporated A.A. meetings into its program. DeStefano, 247 F.3d at 401. 
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principles similar or identical to the Twelve Steps.55 For 
example, in Warner v. Orange County Department of 
Probation,56 the Second Circuit held that a probationer could not 
be compelled to attend A.A. meetings against his will when he 
had no foreknowledge of A.A.’s “intensely religious events”57 
and he had not waived his objection to attending the meetings.58 
As support for its unilateral transformation of A.A. into a 
religious organization,59 the Second Circuit cited the various 
                                                          
The court upheld Warner but found that the state funding of a large, purely 
secular alcohol treatment program that merely incorporated A.A. as a part of 
the program did not, by itself, violate the Establishment Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. Id. at 408-09. 
55 See Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
N.A. is a religious organization). Although A.A. is not affiliated with any 
other organization, it cooperates with those wishing to adopt A.A.’s methods 
to combat addiction. See, e.g., supra note 44 (quoting A.A.’s sixth tradition); 
Information on Alcoholics Anonymous, form F-2 (Alcoholics Anonymous 
World Service, Inc. 1999). For example, Narcotics Anonymous (“N.A.”) has 
adapted A.A.’s Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions to conform to its own 
mission. See The Toronto Area of Narcotics Anonymous, Twelve Steps of 
Narcotics Anonymous, at http://www.torontona.ca/12%20steps.htm (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2002); The Toronto Area of Narcotics Anonymous, Twelve 
Traditions of Narcotics Anonymous, at http://www.torontona.ca/12% 
20traditions.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2002). 
56 115 F.3d 1068. 
57 Id. at 1075. 
58 Id. at 1074. 
59 The term “unilateral” serves a dual purpose. First, although the Second 
Circuit was not the first to hold that a twelve step program constituted a 
religious organization for Establishment Clause purposes, it was the highest 
federal court to apply that distinction specifically to A.A. The Seventh Circuit, 
in Kerr v. Farrey, had already determined that Narcotics Anonymous was a 
religious organization. 95 F.3d at 480. Kerr addressed an inmate’s claim that 
the state had violated his constitutional rights by coercing him to attend N.A. 
meetings. Id. at 473. The court found that the meetings centered on N.A.’s 
own version of the Twelve Steps, which, nearly identical to A.A.’s, included 
references to God. Id. at 474. The court stated that regardless of one’s 
interpretation of God, N.A. had incorporated into its program a “religious 
concept of a higher power.” Id. at 480. The state, therefore, could not coerce 
prisoners to attend N.A. meetings. Id. Second, the term “unilaterally” is used 
here to draw attention to the fact that the Second Circuit, while appearing to 
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references within the Twelve Steps to “God” or a “Higher 
Power,”60 as well as the Southern District of New York’s factual 
findings that the A.A. meetings at issue incorporated 
“Christian”61 prayers.62 The court did not indicate which factor 
was decisive—the references to God or the use of prayer. 
Consequently, it is not clear whether the court viewed the 
language of the Twelve Steps alone as sufficient for A.A. to 
qualify as a religious organization, or whether something more, 
such as the incorporation of prayer, is necessary. 
Although the Second Circuit has not clarified the issue, were 
it to do so it would likely find that the Twelve Steps language 
alone is insufficient to deem A.A. a religious entity. The Warner 
court quoted passages from the Twelve Steps,63 but it is not clear 
that the court did anything more than selectively choose only 
                                                          
act on A.A.’s behalf by affording a special degree of constitutional protection, 
operated without any input by A.A, which has always adhered to the view that 
it is a secular organization. See supra note 50 (referring to the various 
statements A.A. has made regarding its secular nature). 
60 Warner, 115 F.3d at 1070. The court noted that A.A.’s second, third, 
fifth, sixth, seventh, and eleventh steps contain either or both references. Id.; 
see also supra note 41 (listing the Twelve Steps).  
61 Warner, 115 F.3d at 1070; see also Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of 
Prob., 870 F. Supp. 69, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (describing the “Lord’s Prayer” 
as being “specifically Christian”). The meetings Warner attended began with 
the “Serenity Prayer,” which the district court determined was “non-
denominational.” Id. It states, “Lord, grant me the serenity to accept the 
things that I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the 
wisdom to know the difference.” Id. Additionally, the district court found that 
the meetings ended with the “Lord’s Prayer.” Id. The King James version of 
the Bible translates the Lord’s Prayer: 
Our Father which art in heaven, Hallowed be thy name. 
Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven. 
Give us this day our daily bread. 
And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors 
And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil: For thine is 
the kingdom, and the power, and the glory, for ever. Amen. 
Matthew 6:9-13.  
62 Warner, 115 F.3d at 1070. 
63 Id. 
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those passages supporting its view that A.A. is a religious 
organization.64 If this is true, the case sets an unnerving 
precedent. While judicial interpretation of an organization’s 
doctrine might be necessary to draw legal conclusions, the 
judiciary should in so doing ensure that the process is a diligent 
effort to uncover the truth.65 Applying standards similar to canons 
of statutory interpretation, a court should necessarily extend its 
investigation beyond the ambiguous verbiage of the Twelve Steps 
in order to give effect to A.A.’s intent.66 Consequently, the court 
would find that A.A. considers it appropriate to look to the 
organization itself as one’s “Higher Power.”67 Thus, within the 
A.A. framework, the terms “Higher Power” and “God” assume 
entirely generic characteristics.68 Mere reference to a Higher 
                                                          
64 Id. 
65 See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 174 (1986) (describing the U.S. 
“system of justice” as “dedicated to a search for truth”); see also United 
States v. Roberson, 859 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that federal 
courts “construe evidentiary privileges narrowly” because they “obstruct the 
search for truth”); In re Cueto, 554 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[T]he public 
has a right to every person’s evidence. There are a small number of 
constitutional, common-law and statutory exceptions to that general rule, but 
they have been neither ‘lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are 
in derogation of the search for truth.’”) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 710 (1974)). 
66 See, e.g., New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 
91 U.S. 656, 662 (1875) (“Statutes must be interpreted according to the intent 
and meaning of the legislature.”). 
67 TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 27. 
68 See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 756 (3d ed. 1996) (defining 
“generic” as “relating to or descriptive of an entire group or class; general”). 
In this context, since one following the Twelve Steps can view either one’s 
interpretation of God or the A.A. group itself as one’s higher power, then in 
the A.A. framework, the A.A. group would be analogous to God. In religious 
terms, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to draw an acceptable 
comparison between the A.A. group and a divine entity. Since both can be 
considered as one’s higher power, however, it would seem that to the 
recovering alcoholic following A.A.’s guidelines, either God or the A.A. 
group would serve generally as a source, beyond the individual, to which one 
looks for strength and guidance. See Richard D. Land & Michael K. 
Whitehead, Do Students Have a Prayer After Lee v. Weisman, 6 U. FLA. J.L. 
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Power or God within the Twelve Steps, without more, is hardly 
sufficient to label A.A. a religious organization, lest the Twelve 
Steps become to the twenty-first century what the “neck verse” 
was to the seventeenth.69 
                                                          
& PUB. POL’Y 231, 245 (1994) (referring to “a generic ‘brand-X’ God”); 
Melissa M. Weldon, Honoring the Spirit in the Law: A Lawyer’s Confession of 
Faith, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1167, 1167 (1999) (describing both “higher 
power” and “God” as “generic terms”). 
69 The term “neck verse” refers to the test once utilized in England to 
determine whether a criminally accused person was a member of the clergy 
and, thus, deserving of the “benefit of clergy,” which precluded 
administration of the death penalty. HAROLD POTTER, POTTER’S HISTORICAL 
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 362-63 (A.K.R. 
Kiralfy ed., 1958). Until the early eighteenth century, benefit of clergy was 
conferred upon only those who could read, the presumption being that clergy 
were the only literate members of society. See Sir Frank Kermode, Justice and 
Mercy in Shakespeare, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1155, 1163 (1996). To establish 
literacy, the court required an accused to read or recite a particular biblical 
verse. POTTER, supra, at 362. As the literacy rate increased, however, and 
knowledge of the verse became widespread, the neck verse became unreliable, 
eventually serving to aid even those who were prohibited by law from 
becoming ordained. Id. 
 Had the Warner court determined that the mere presence of words 
evoking the concept of  “God” within the credo or doctrine of an organization 
was, by itself, enough to label that organization religious, the Establishment 
Clause would take on new meaning. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668, 692-93 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (referring to the United States’ 
adoption of “‘In God We Trust’ on coins, and opening court sessions with 
‘God save the United States and this honorable court’” as “government 
acknowledgements of religion,” as opposed to endorsement of religion). In 
Lynch, the Court held that a city’s inclusion of a Nativity scene within its 
Christmas display did not constitute government endorsement or advancement 
of religion and, thus, violate the Establishment Clause when the purpose and 
the overall effect of the display were secular. Id. at 681-83. The Court noted 
that the display, aside from the Nativity scene, also included “a Santa Claus 
house, reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, 
carolers, cutout figures representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, 
and a teddy bear, hundreds of colored lights, [and] a large banner that reads 
‘Seasons Greetings’ . . . .” Id. at 671. The court went on to say the following: 
It would be ironic, however, if the inclusion of a single symbol of a 
particular historic religious event, as part of a celebration 
acknowledged in the Western World for 20 centuries, and in this 
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As the Second Circuit stated in Warner, however, something 
more was present at the meetings the plaintiff attended—Christian 
prayers.70 This appears to have tipped the scales in favor of 
recognizing A.A. as a religious organization.71 But, the Warner 
                                                          
country by the people, by the Executive Branch, by the Congress, 
and the courts for two centuries, would so “taint” the City’s exhibit 
as to render it violative of the Establishment Clause. To forbid the 
use of this one passive symbol—the crèche—at the very time people 
are taking note of the season with Christmas hymns and carols in 
public schools and other public places, and while the Congress and 
Legislatures open sessions with prayers by paid chaplains would be a 
stilted over-reaction contrary to our history and to our holdings. If the 
presence of the crèche in this display violates the Establishment 
Clause, a host of other forms of taking official note of Christmas, and 
of our religious heritage, are equally offensive to the Constitution. 
Id. at 686. Later holding that a county and city’s display depicting the Nativity 
violated the Establishment Clause, the Court, in County of Allegheny v. 
American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, interpreted Lynch 
to require an evaluation of the setting of the religious symbol. 492 U.S. 573, 
598 (1989). The display at issue in County of Allegheny contained only the 
Nativity scene encased in a “floral frame.” Id. at 599. It follows that the 
Warner court would be compelled to view the religious references within 
A.A.’s Twelve Steps in relation to their “setting,” as the Supreme Court did 
in County of Allegheny, before determining that A.A. is a religious 
organization. Id. Otherwise, any organized group could conceivably 
incorporate the concept of God, even superficially, within its bylaws or motto, 
and enjoy the constitutional status of a religious organization.  Such a course 
would render the Establishment Clause as meaningless as the neck verse, 
which was abolished in 1707. See POTTER, supra, at 363. 
70 Warner, 115 F.3d at 1075. 
71 Id. Looking beyond the Twelve Steps, the Warner court stated the 
following: 
The A.A. program to which Warner was exposed had a substantial 
religious component. Participants were told to pray to God for help in 
overcoming their affliction. Meetings opened and closed with group 
prayer. The trial judge reasonably found that it “placed a heavy 
emphasis on spirituality and prayer, in both conception and in 
practice.” We have no doubt that the meetings Warner attended were 
intensely religious events. 
Id. (emphasis added). In a footnote following the above passage, the Warner 
court noted that the district court had focused much of its attention on the 
prayers at the A.A. meetings in question. Id. n.6. 
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court disregarded the fact that each of the 100,766 A.A. groups 
currently operating worldwide is entirely autonomous,72 needs 
only two people to exist73 and completely controls the content and 
format of its meetings.74 Thus, the Second Circuit’s 
determination that, as a matter of law, A.A. in its entirety is a 
religious organization sweeps aside one of the crucial support 
structures enabling A.A. to exist and succeed—its anti-
dogmatism.75 Despite the label affixed by the Second Circuit, 
A.A. continues to hold itself out as a loosely organized secular 
society comprised of groups of alcoholics gathered for the sole 
purpose of removing alcohol from their lives.76 
                                                          
72 See supra note 44 (quoting A.A.’s fourth and seventh traditions). 
73  See TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 146-
47. A.A.’s sponsorship method and tradition four suggest that at least two 
people are necessary to form a “group.” See id. There are, however, “lone” 
members who maintain contact with the General Service Office in New York. 
This Is AA, supra note 50, at 19. Furthermore, A.A.’s explanation of tradition 
three states that a person is a member of A.A. if she “says so.” TWELVE 
STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 139. The desire to stop 
drinking is the only requirement. Id.  
74 TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 146 
(“[E]very A.A. group can manage its affairs exactly as it pleases.”). 
75 A complete analysis of the Warner decision is beyond the scope of this 
note. While the author does not entirely agree with the Second Circuit’s 
decision, he does accept the decision’s precedential value in recognizing A.A. 
as a religious organization. 
76 See Alcoholics Anonymous, Defining “Alcoholics Anonymous,” at 
http://www.alcoholics-anonymous.org/english/E_FactFile/M-24_d3.html (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2002). The web site describes A.A. in the following terms: 
Alcoholics Anonymous is a fellowship of men and women who share 
their experience, strength and hope with each other that they may 
solve their common problem and help others to recover from 
alcoholism. 
The only requirement for membership is a desire to stop drinking. 
There are no dues or fees for A.A. membership; we are self-
supporting through our own contributions. A.A. is not allied with any 
sect, denomination, politics, organization or institution; does not wish 
to engage in any controversy; neither endorses nor opposes any 
causes. Our primary purpose is to stay sober and help other 
alcoholics achieve sobriety. 
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C. The Sheep Follows the Shepherd Down the Slippery Slope 
By extending New York’s religious privilege to protect 
communications within A.A., the Southern District of New York 
offers a glimpse of the potentially far-reaching problems that will 
inevitably arise from the Second Circuit’s Warner decision.77 On 
December 6, 1994, Paul Cox was convicted of a double homicide 
he had committed six years before in Westchester County, N.Y.78 
In 1988, Mr. Cox, after an evening of heavy drinking, entered 
his former childhood residence and repeatedly stabbed Shanta 
Chervu and her husband Lakshman Rao Chervu with one of their 
own kitchen knives.79 A palm print and a fingerprint were the 
only pieces of physical evidence left at the scene of the crime.80 
Despite committing the acts in what he later claimed was the 
midst of an alcoholic blackout, Mr. Cox had the wherewithal to 
dispose of the weapon and his bloody clothes upon returning 
home, where he lived with his parents.81 The crime remained 
unsolved for several years.82 
In 1990, Mr. Cox began attending A.A. meetings.83 During 
the course of his recovery, Mr. Cox revealed to “at least eight 
fellow A.A. members” his belief that he had killed the Chervus.84 
He later claimed that his blackout on the night of the murders 
prevented him from knowing for a fact that he was the killer.85 
                                                          
Alcoholics Anonymous can also be defined as an informal society of 
more than 2,000,000 recovered alcoholics in the United States, 
Canada, and other countries. 
Id. 
77 Cox v. Miller, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Warner v. 
Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir. 1996). 
78 Cox v. Miller, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 788. 
79 Id. 




84 Id. at 789-90. 
85 Id. 
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Still, he made no effort to dispel the uncertainty.86 Among those 
in whom Mr. Cox confided his secret was Ms. H,87 who lived 
with Mr. Cox and attended A.A. meetings with him.88 After Mr. 
Cox told Ms. H of his questionable past, Ms. H divulged this 
information to her psychologist, who then advised her to seek the 
advice of counsel.89 On the advice of her attorney, Ms. H then 
told the district attorney what she knew.90 The law enforcement 
authorities questioned the other A.A. members and, based on the 
information gained, established the probable cause necessary to 
arrest Mr. Cox.91 Mr. Cox was charged with and convicted of 
                                                          
86 Id. 
87 See id. at 790 (noting that the prosecutor and the trial court maintained 
the anonymity of the testifying A.A. members by identifying them by the first 




91 Although this note focuses on the Cox court’s determination that 
communication within A.A. is privileged, the Cox opinion is troubling for 
other reasons. Ultimately, the court granted Mr. Cox habeas corpus based on 
its finding that Mr. Cox’s fingerprints, procured solely as a result of probable 
cause established by the compelled statements of his fellow A.A. members, 
were, thus, wrongfully obtained. Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 792, 793. Because 
the fingerprint and palm print Mr. Cox left behind were the only pieces of 
physical evidence linking him to the crime, the court determined that without 
that evidence law enforcement would have been unable to establish the 
probable cause necessary to arrest Mr. Cox in the first place. Id. 
Consequently, the court held that the evidence should have “been suppressed 
as ‘fruit of the poison tree.’” Id. (quoting, without attribution, Nardone v. 
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).  
 Justice Frankfurter, in Nardone, first coined the poetic metaphor to which 
the Cox court referred. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341. Since then, the term has 
been used to illustrate the principle that information gathered from evidence 
wrongfully obtained is tainted and, thus, inadmissible. See, e.g., Florida v. 
White, 526 U.S. 559, 565-66 (1999) (holding that a warrantless search did not 
violate the criminal defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights and, thus, the 
evidence obtained therefrom was not tainted); Harrison v. United States, 392 
U.S. 219, 222 (1968) (holding that a criminal defendant’s testimony was 
tainted, and thus inadmissible, when “impelled” by the desire to overcome the 
effects of illegally obtained confessions); People v. Powers, 732 N.Y.S.2d 
779, 780 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (holding that “oral admission” offered by a 
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manslaughter in the first degree and sentenced to a maximum of 
fifty years in prison.92 The Appellate Division of the New York 
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,93 and the Court of 
Appeals of New York denied Mr. Cox leave to appeal.94 Mr. 
Cox then petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds 
that, inter alia, law enforcement authorities had no probable 
cause to arrest him absent the A.A. members’ testimony, use of 
which Mr. Cox claimed violated his constitutional rights under 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.95 Specifically, Mr. Cox 
                                                          
criminal defendant after police searched his apartment pursuant to a warrant 
that was later found invalid was admissible). This principle was, perhaps, first 
elucidated by Justice Holmes, who wrote, “The essence of a provision 
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely 
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be 
used at all.” Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 
(1920) (emphasis added). Regarding an exception to the rule, Justice Holmes 
continued, “[T]his does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred 
and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source 
they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the 
Government’s own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed.” Id. 
Whether the “fruit of the poison tree” principle applies to privileged 
communication, however, is unclear. At least one court has observed that “no 
court has ever applied this theory to any evidentiary privilege.” United States 
v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 731 n.11 (9th Cir. 1990) (refusing to address a 
claim that evidence allegedly procured as the result of violations of the spousal 
privilege should be suppressed); see also United States v. Squillacote, 221 
F.3d 542, 560 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing and quoting Marashi with 
approval). For support, the Marashi court looked to United States v. 
Lefkowitz, which stated in a footnote that information obtained indirectly from 
privileged communication, when the privilege was not constitutionally 
grounded, such as the marital privilege, would not be considered tainted. 
Marashi, 913 F.2d at 731 n.11. See Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1319 n.8 (9th 
Cir. 1980). The Cox court’s summary disposition of the matter, therefore, was 
disingenuous, and the issue, though beyond the scope of this note, is ripe for 
the picking. 
92 Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 788; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20 
(Consol. 2002) (defining and proscribing first degree manslaughter). 
93 People v. Cox, 696 N.Y.S.2d  177 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). 
94 People v. Cox, 728 N.E.2d 985 (N.Y. 2000). 
95 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The First 
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argued that communication with A.A. members was confidential 
and protected by New York’s religious privilege.96 Based on the 
Second Circuit’s holding that A.A. is a religious organization,97 
the district court concluded that the Establishment Clause could 
not sustain applying the religious privilege to other established 
religions and not A.A., a judicially established religion.98 
Consequently, the court granted Mr. Cox his writ, though it 
withheld issuance until the Second Circuit could review the 
district court’s decision.99 Presently, the judicially established 
church of A.A. still stands, and the Cox opinion will surely serve 
as a measuring stick to see how far the Second Circuit will allow 
the Warner opinion to slide down the slippery slope.100 
II. WHY LAW AND POLICY MUST REMOVE THE GAG FROM A.A. 
The Cox decision is the first in the nation to apply the 
                                                          
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1791, reads, “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for 
a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Fourteenth Amendment, 
ratified in 1868, reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive a person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
96 Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 790. 
97 Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir. 
1996). 
98 Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 792 (“There is no principled basis for a court 
to hold that A.A. is a religion for Establishment Clause purposes, and yet that 
disclosure of wrongs to a fellow member as ordained by the Twelve Steps 
does not qualify for purposes of a privilege granted to other religions similarly 
situated.”). 
99 Id. at 793. 
100 Warner, 115 F.3d 1068. 
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religious privilege to communication within A.A.101 Given that 
numerous organizations have adopted A.A.’s Twelve Steps,102 it 
is likely that they will be recognized as religious organizations as 
well.103 Consequently, if the Cox opinion is accepted, the 
religious privilege would also apply to these groups. This must 
not happen. The Cox decision is based on faulty factual analysis 
and legal reasoning, and public policy demands that the religious 
privilege not be extended to communications between A.A. 
members.104 
                                                          
101 Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787. 
102 Although this list is not exhaustive, examples of organizations adopting 
variations of A.A.’s Twelve Steps include the following: Cocaine Anonymous, 
Cocaine Anonymous World Services, 12 Steps & 12 Traditions of C.A., at 
http:// www.ca.org/12and12.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2002); Co-Dependents 
Anonymous, The Twelve Steps of Co-Dependents Anonymous, at http://www. 
codependents.org/coda12st.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2002); Crystal Meth 
Anonymous, The Twelve Steps of Crystal Meth Anonymous, at http://www. 
crystalmeth.org/aboutCMA.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2002); Debtors 
Anonymous, 12 Steps of Debtors Anonymous, at http://www. 
debtorsanonymous.org/steps.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2002); Emotions 
Anonymous, The Twelve Steps of Emotions Anonymous, at http://www.mtn. 
org/EA/Steps.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2002); Gamblers Anonymous, The 
Recovery Program, at http://www.gamblersanonymous.org/recovery.html 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2002); Marijuana Anonymous, The Twelve Steps of 
Marijuana Anonymous, at http://www.marijuana-anonymous.org/Pages/ 
12steps.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2002); Narcotics Anonymous, supra note 
55; Nicotine Anonymous, The Twelve Steps of Nicotine Anonymous, at 
http://www.nicotine-anonymous.org/pamphlet/english/2001_12steps.html (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2002); Overeaters Anonymous, The Twelve Steps, at http:// 
www.overeatersanonymous.org/12steps.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2002); 
Sexaholics Anonymous, The Twelve Steps of Sexaholics Anonymous, at http:// 
www.sa.org/steps/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2002); Sexual Compulsives 
Anonymous, The Twelve Suggested Steps of SCA, at http://www.sca-recovery. 
org/Steps.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2002); and Survivors of Incest 
Anonymous, The Twelve Steps, at http://www.siawso.org/12steps.htm (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2002). 
103 See, e.g., Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that N.A. is a religious organization). 
104 See infra Part II.B (discussing the policy implications of the Cox 
decision).  
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A. Dismantling Cox 
The district court’s decision in Cox is flawed for a number of 
reasons. It not only mischaracterizes A.A.’s structure and 
methods, but it also completely overlooks a Supreme Court 
limitation on the judiciary’s ability to develop evidentiary 
privileges, thus ignoring the obvious boundaries of the religious 
privilege.105 Similarly, although the court quotes the New York 
statute granting the religious privilege,106 it then misinterprets a 
New York decision in order to circumvent the explicit legislative 
requirements.107 As a result, the Cox court establishes a precedent 
with no legal, logical or social support whatsoever. 
1. Misunderstanding A.A. 
The Cox opinion makes several statements describing A.A. in 
a way that could only have resulted from misunderstanding the 
organization and the principles that have ensured its survival and 
notable success.108 Although it is questionable whether and how 
far courts should delve into a particular organization’s doctrine, 
the Second Circuit’s opinion in Warner established precedent for 
doing so, at least with respect to determining whether an 
organization is, in fact, religious.109 The Cox court followed the 
Second Circuit’s example, even to the extent of not fully 
analyzing A.A.’s doctrine before arriving at its unfortunate 
conclusion.110 
                                                          
105 See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the restraints on the federal judiciary 
in developing evidentiary privileges).  
106 Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 790; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 
(McKinney 2001). The New York statute requires a communication to be of a 
confessional or confidential nature revealed to a member of the clergy who is 
acting in her professional capacity as a spiritual advisor. Id. 
107 See People v. Carmona, 627 N.E.2d 959 (N.Y. 1993). See infra Part  
II.A.2 (discussing the Cox court’s application of Carmona). 
108 See supra note 25 (noting A.A.’s size in terms of members). 
109 Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1070 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (discussing the references to “God” in the Twelve Steps). 
110 See Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 789. 
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Beginning with the statement “initially A.A. was a self-help 
group which did not consider or represent itself as an established 
religion, but helped many Alcoholics, who continued to belong to 
and worship with their own churches or other religious groups 
while belonging to A.A.,”111 the Cox court reveals all too quickly 
the inadequacy of its inquiry. The quoted sentence implies two 
false facts: (1) A.A. now considers itself to represent a religion, 
and (2) A.A. members are necessarily religious and affiliated 
with a church. These are boldly inaccurate assumptions. While 
some courts may have intervened to dub A.A. a religious 
organization,112 A.A. has always held itself out as secular and has 
never endorsed any religion.113 Furthermore, the members of 
A.A. do not necessarily belong to a religious organization, as 
A.A. welcomes anyone seeking sobriety regardless of his or her 
theological beliefs.114 Thus, the district court’s initial 
                                                          
The Twelve Steps must be accomplished one by one, beginning with 
the first step. A new member will be sponsored and assisted by one 
or more existing members of the organization. Members interact on a 
first name basis only. The entire relationship is both anonymous and 
confidential. Members are forbidden from telling outside statements 
made at a meeting. The eighth step requires the new member to have 
“made a list of all persons we had harmed and became willing to 
make amends to them all.” Step five, preliminary to step eight, 
required that the new member have “admitted to God, to ourselves, 
and to another human being the exact nature of our wrongs.” 
Id. (quoting the Twelve Steps) (alterations in original). It is interesting to note 
that, while the district court treated A.A.’s Twelve Steps as though they were 
binding on the members and enforced by the organization, the fact that Mr. 
Cox revealed his secret to no fewer than eight fellow A.A. members, as 
opposed to simply “another human being,” as the court emphasized, seems not 
to have caused the court any hesitation. Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 789-90. 
111 Id. at 789 (emphasis added). 
112 See supra note 53 (discussing cases that have found A.A. to be a 
religious organization). 
113 ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 36, at xx; 44 Questions, supra 
note 50, at 19; This Is AA, supra note 50, at 7. 
114 See TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 139; 
see also supra Part I.B (discussing the gradual judicial perception of A.A. as a 
religious organization despite A.A.’s contrary position and its provision of 
interpretive guidance for atheist members). 
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characterization is clearly incorrect. 
Having set the pace, the Cox court stays on a misguided 
course throughout its opinion, stating that A.A. members are 
“forbidden” from revealing statements made at the meetings,115 
that A.A. “impos[ed]” its discipline on Mr. Cox,116 and that the 
organization requires the Twelve Steps to be followed in a 
particular manner.117 Although anonymity might be a driving 
force behind A.A.’s success, as with the other traditions, the 
extent to which A.A. members maintain anonymity is entirely 
self-determined.118 A.A. makes no demands; therefore, it cannot 
forbid its members from discussing the meetings or the 
information conveyed therein.119 Similarly, A.A. lacks the desire 
and the authority to impose itself on anyone.120 Nor does A.A. 
attempt to dictate to members how they must work through the 
Twelve Steps.121 Rather, A.A. expressly states that individuals 
                                                          
115 Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 789. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. (“The Twelve Steps must be accomplished one by one.”). 
118  See TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 184. 
The anonymous nature of A.A. was initially meant to protect alcoholics who, 
for various reasons, wanted to conceal their association with the group. Id. 
Hence, A.A. members refer to one another by only their first name and last 
initial. Understanding Anonymity, pamphlet P-47, at 10 (Alcoholics 
Anonymous World Services, Inc., 1981). For example, A.A. literature refers 
to one of its cofounders, Mr. Wilson, as Bill W. See, e.g., id. at 7. Mr. 
Wilson and Dr. Smith were aware of the consequences being labeled an 
alcoholic could have on businesspeople, professionals, and those desiring to 
maintain a particular social status. Id. at 5. In the 1930s and 40s, when A.A. 
was a fledgling organization and the disease of alcoholism was not well 
understood, people were wary of the social stigma of being associated with an 
organization for recovering alcoholics. Id. at 5-7. Although much more is now 
known, A.A.’s principle of anonymity is still important in light of the social 
stigma that persists today. Id.; see also supra note 44 (quoting A.A.’s twelfth 
tradition). 
119 TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 129 (“No 
A.A. [sic] can compel another to do anything; nobody can be punished or 
expelled.”). 
120 Id. 
121 See 44 Questions, supra note 50, at 16 (“The absence of rules, 
regulations, or musts is one of the unique features of A.A. as a local group 
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should accomplish the steps in whatever manner they feel 
comfortable.122 A.A.’s Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions are 
merely suggestions for those seeking sobriety.123 A member has 
no obligation to A.A., legal or otherwise, other than those she 
may create for herself.124 Consequently, the A.A. member is—or 
was, before Cox—free to tell the world everything that happened 
at the meetings.125 Although the member who does this may not 
feel welcome at future meetings with the same group, any effort 
to exclude her would violate many, if not all, of A.A.’s 
principles.126 
                                                          
and as a worldwide fellowship.”). 
122 Id. 
123 See TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 129. 
Although theoretically true, A.A.’s explanation of tradition one states that 
A.A. members will eventually come to realize on their own that the steps are 
necessary for the alcoholic’s survival. Id. at 130-31. 
124 Id. at 129. 
125 Id. The Cox opinion strips A.A. members of their ability to participate 
in the criminal justice system by reporting known criminal activity as is 
expected of responsible citizens. See infra Part II.B (discussing the policy 
implications of the Cox decision). The psychological effects of this judicial 
segregation could cost recovering alcoholics their sobriety. See, e.g., Kathleen 
T. Brady & Susan C. Sonne, The Role of Stress in Alcohol Use, Alcoholism 
Treatment, and Relapse, 23 ALCOHOL RES. & HEALTH, No. 4, 263-71 (1999) 
(noting a relation between the physiological effects of stress, social factors and 
alcohol relapse); James R. McKay, Studies of Factors in Relapse to Alcohol, 
Drug and Nicotine Use: A Critical Review of Methodologies and Findings, 60 
J. OF STUD. ON ALCOHOL, No. 4, at 566 (1999) (stating that the various 
methodologies all conclude that, inter alia, interpersonal and emotional issues 
contribute to relapse). 
126 See generally TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 
32. One of the underlying principles of A.A. is the acceptance of flawed 
individuals. Id. at 139. A.A. explains tradition three:  
A.A. is really saying to every serious drinker, “You are an A.A. 
member if you say so. You can declare yourself in; nobody can keep 
you out. No matter who you are, no matter how low you’ve gone, no 
matter how grave your emotional complications—even your crimes—
we still can’t deny you A.A.” 
Id. Thus, A.A. serves as a den of equality, where persons admittedly at the 
lowest point in their lives can seek the support of others without fear of being 
judged. Id. Breaching an obligation some members may view as sacred 
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2.   Cox Misinterprets the New York Court of Appeals 
Beyond mischaracterizing A.A., the Cox opinion overstates 
the applicability of the New York decision in People v. 
Carmona.127 In Carmona, the New York Court of Appeals 
discussed the applicability of the religious privilege to 
communications between the defendant, who was a confessed 
killer, and two ministers.128 Without making reference to the 
religion practiced by the ministers who had spoken to the 
defendant, the Carmona court discussed the evolution of the 
religious privilege, stressing its modern-day application to 
communications taking place beyond the realm of the Catholic 
confessional.129 The Carmona court stated that the privilege 
applies to confidential communication with ministers of all 
religions, and that the only test for determining whether the 
communication is privileged is “whether the communication in 
question was made in confidence and for the purpose of obtaining 
spiritual guidance.”130 The status of the ministers in Carmona, 
however, was never in question; therefore, the issue was neither 
discussed nor dismissed as unnecessary. 
In contrast, the chief issue before the Cox court was whether 
A.A. members are “professional . . . spiritual advisor[s]”131 as 
required by New York’s religious privilege.132 The district court 
in Cox quoted verbatim much of the Carmona court’s discussion, 
                                                          
arguably would only serve as a symptom of a member’s illness. Id. at 141. 
“[E]xperience taught us that to take away any alcoholic’s full chance was 
sometimes to pronounce his death sentence, and often to condemn him to 
endless misery. Who dared to be judge, jury, and executioner of his own sick 
brother?” Id. 
127 627 N.E.2d 959 (N.Y. 1993). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 961. 
130 Id. at 962. 
131 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 2001). 
132 Id. The lack of treatment afforded the issue, however, suggests 
otherwise. See infra II.A.4 (discussing the Cox court’s conversion of A.A. in 
order to apply the religious privilege). 
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relying heavily on the usurped text and little else.133 In doing so, 
the Cox opinion ultimately afforded too much weight to a largely 
inapposite case.134 
                                                          
133 See Cox v. Miller, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 791 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The Cox 
court quoted the following passage from Carmona: 
Although often referred to as a “priest-penitent” privilege, the 
statutory privilege is not limited to communications with a particular 
class of clerics or congregants. Nor is it confined to “penitential 
admission[s] . . . of a perceived transgression” or “avowals made 
‘under the cloak of the confessional.’” On the contrary, in enacting 
CPLR 4505, the Legislature intended to recognize “the urgent need 
of the people to confide in, without fear of reprisal, those entrusted 
with the pressing task of offering spiritual guidance” without regard 
to the religion’s specific beliefs or practices. While the privilege may 
have “ha[d] its origins in the Roman Catholic sacrament of Penance, 
in which a person privately confesses his or her sins to a priest [and 
t]he priest is enjoined by Church law . . . to maintain the 
confidentiality of the confession,” the New York statute is 
intentionally aimed at all religious ministers who perform “significant 
spiritual counseling which may involve disclosure of sensitive 
matters.”  Indeed, the drafters of the current codification struck the 
concluding phrase from the predecessor provision, which made the 
privilege applicable to communications made “in the course of 
discipline, enjoined by the rules or practice of the religious body to 
which he belongs” because the phrase was ambiguous and rendered it 
“doubtful whether the rule applies to any confessions other than those 
to a Catholic priest.” Accordingly, what is more appropriately 
dubbed the “cleric-congregant” privilege is applicable to ministers of 
all religions, most of which have no ritual analogous to that of the 
Catholic confession. Despite the concurrence’s “four canon” analysis, 
New York’s test for the privilege’s applicability distills to a single 
inquiry: whether the communication in question was made in 
confidence and for the purpose of obtaining spiritual guidance. 
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
134 See generally Carmona, 627 N.E.2d 959. More recent New York 
cases demonstrate that Carmona did not eliminate the requirement that the 
communication be made to a member of the clergy as the Cox court implies. 
See, e.g., Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (N.Y. 2001) (noting 
that New York’s religious privilege “applies to confidential communications 
made by congregants to clerics of all religions”) (citing Carmona, 627 N.E.2d 
959). 
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3.  Testimonial Privileges Should Be Strictly Construed 
The Cox opinion disregards the limitations the Supreme Court 
has placed on the federal judiciary’s ability to develop evidentiary 
privileges.135 In Trammel v. United States,136 the Supreme Court 
                                                          
135 See generally Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787. The Cox opinion quotes 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 and discusses one New York case addressing the statute. 
Id. at 790-91. The district court, however, made no reference to Federal Rule 
of Evidence 501, which provides the federal judiciary the ability to create and 
develop evidentiary rules “[e]xcept as otherwise required by the Constitution 
of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by 
the Supreme Court.” FED. R. EVID. 501. Nor did the court address Federal 
Rule of Evidence 1101(c), which states, “The rule with respect to privileges 
applies at all stages of actions, cases, and proceedings.” FED. R. EVID. 
1101(c); see also FED. R. EVID. 1101(c) advisory committee’s note (stating 
that “singling out the rules of privilege for special treatment, is made 
necessary by the limited applicability of the remaining rules”). The conclusion 
that the Cox court should have incorporated federal law into its opinion is 
further supported by Duckworth v. Owen, II, a case in which the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari to a state prisoner convicted of state crimes who 
claimed that the Seventh Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, erred in holding 
that the Federal Rules of Evidence, and not a particular state’s (in that case, 
Indiana’s) evidentiary rules, apply in a federal habeas decision. 452 U.S. 951, 
951 (1981). Although the Supreme Court’s denial contains no textual material, 
the dissenting opinion is enlightening. See id. at 951 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). Noting that whether the federal rules of evidence applied in this 
case was the only question presented, the dissent states, “No one would 
disagree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Indiana rules of 
evidence do not apply in a federal habeas proceeding.” Id. at 953 (emphasis 
added); see also Procella v. Beto, 319 F. Supp. 662, 670 (S.D. Tex. 1970) 
(noting, in a case involving a state prisoner convicted of state crimes, that 
“federal evidentiary rules govern federal habeas corpus hearings”). In a case 
with issues similar to Cox, Edney v. Smith, Judge Jack Weinstein reviewed a 
state prisoner’s petition for habeas corpus grounded on a claim that the trial 
court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by allowing his psychiatrist to 
testify against him. 425 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). The petitioner 
argued that the court violated the state physician-patient privilege, which he 
claimed was of a constitutional nature. Id. at 1039. Noting that the privilege 
did not exist at common law but that most states had adopted the privilege, 
Judge Weinstein looked to federal law regarding the physician-patient 
privilege to determine whether the petitioner’s claim had merit. Id. at 1039-
45. 
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curtailed the right of a husband to prevent his wife from 
voluntarily testifying against him by claiming spousal privilege.137 
In so doing, the Court described the restraint courts should 
exercise in the development of evidentiary privileges: 
Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene 
the fundamental principle that the public . . . has a right 
to every man’s evidence. As such, they must be strictly 
construed and accepted only to the very limited extent that 
permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant 
evidence has a public good transcending the normally 
                                                          
 Not only did the Cox court fail to address the applicable federal statutory 
guidelines, the court also failed to address the primary Supreme Court 
decision that limits judicial involvement in the creation or expansion of 
evidentiary privileges. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) 
(admonishing federal courts to narrowly construe evidentiary privileges). 
Furthermore, the Cox court made no indication whatsoever as to the standard 
of review the court was applying. See generally Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787. 
136 445 U.S. 40 (1980). 
137 Prior to 1980, Hawkins v. United States was the controlling case with 
respect to the federally established spousal privilege. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 
41, 42 (calling for a re-examination of Hawkins); see also Hawkins, 358 U.S. 
74 (1958). In Hawkins, the Court acknowledged the longstanding common-law 
rule that husbands and wives were incompetent to testify either for or against 
one another. Id. at 74, 75. The Court then pointed out that Funk v. United 
States had altered the common law rule somewhat by allowing spouses to 
testify for each other. Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 76; see also Funk, 290 U.S. 371 
(1933). The Hawkins Court stated, however, that Funk did not alter the rule 
that spouses could not testify against one another. Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 76. 
Upholding this rule and refusing to distinguish between compelled and 
voluntary testimony, the Court held that in the interest of protecting the 
sanctity of marriage, one spouse would not be permitted to testify even 
voluntarily against the other. Id. Despite government arguments that a 
marriage involving a spouse willing to testify against the other was already 
doomed, the Court refused to allow government action to catalyze divorce and 
stated that “adverse testimony given in criminal proceedings would, we think, 
be likely to destroy almost any marriage.” Id. at 78. Noting both the state 
legislative trend of altering the spousal privilege to allow spouses to 
voluntarily testify against one another and the accepted state practice of 
offering a spouse immunity from prosecution for testifying against the other 
spouse, the Trammel Court modified Hawkins to allow spouses to voluntarily 
testify against one another. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53. 
BARRYMACRO7-11FINAL.DOC 7/24/02  11:13 AM 
466 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for 
ascertaining the truth.138 
Not only did the Cox opinion fail to address the Trammel 
decision, the district court also ignored the principle adopted 
therein by the Supreme Court. Had the district court made any 
effort to “strictly construe[]” New York’s religious privilege as 
Trammel requires,139 it could not have determined that the 
members of A.A. qualify as clergy. Even ignoring other 
jurisdictions’ applications of the privilege, which might also have 
persuaded the court to alter its course, it would be difficult to 
argue that the New York legislature would consider A.A. 
members clergy when it expressly requires Christian Science 
practitioners to be “duly accredited” for the privilege to apply.140 
Rather than follow legislative limitations and realism to their 
logical ends, however, the district took it upon itself to ordain 
more than a million unsuspecting A.A. members.141 
4. Forcing a Square Peg into a Round Hole 
The Cox court applied Carmona in an effort to circumvent the 
statutory requirement that the person with whom the 
communication is made be a “clergyman, or other minister of 
any religion or duly accredited Christian Science practitioner.”142 
This requirement, however, is not completely ignored. The 
district court satisfied itself by finding, without explanation, that 
members of A.A. are “ordained by the Twelve Steps” and that 
“all members exercise the office of clergyman.”143 Thus, the 
court found that the Establishment Clause, which at a minimum 
                                                          
138 Id. at 50. 
139 Id. Trammel requires federal courts to consider whether expanding the 
particular privilege would serve a “public good transcending the normally 
predominant principle” of discovering the truth. Id. This note concludes that 
expanding the religious privilege to speech within A.A. causes more public 
harm than good. 
140 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 2001). 
141 See supra note 25 (noting A.A.’s size in terms of members). 
142 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 2001). 
143 Cox v. Miller, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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prohibits the government from preferring one religion over 
another, requires the religious privilege to apply to A.A. just as it 
applies to the “traditionally recognized forms” of religion.144 
The Cox court characterizes A.A. members as clergy in order 
to apply the religious privilege, yet fails to clearly elucidate its 
rationale for doing so.145 Like a parent arguing with a child, the 
court supports its position with an unarticulated, “because I said 
so.” Any effort to explain further would have revealed the 
court’s unjustifiable reasoning. The court proceeds as follows: 
(1) assuming a communication occurs with the requisite 
reasonable expectation of confidentiality, the religious privilege 
protects communication with a Catholic priest acting in his 
professional capacity;146 (2) the government cannot show a 
preference for Catholicism, a “traditional” form of religion, over 
A.A., an organization newly designated as religious;147 therefore, 
(3) the religious privilege must apply to A.A.148 
Viewed separately, each point lacks controversy. The first, 
however, that the privilege applies to a priest acting in his 
                                                          
144 Id. Interestingly, the Cox court notes that “it is possible as a matter of 
Constitutional law to have and to practice a religion without having a 
clergyman as such, or where all members exercise the office of clergyman . . 
. .” Id. at 787. Although this might be correct, research has yet to reveal any 
statute granting the religious privilege or any court applying the religious 
privilege when the communication concerned someone who was not a member 
of the clergy. The religious privilege, therefore, should not apply when the 
religion recognizes no spiritual leaders. Perhaps this is why the Cox court 
determined, without hinting to its rationale, that A.A. falls into the latter 
category. Id. Even if the court had offered an explanation, it would still be 
hard pressed to find support for its assumption that the privilege would apply 
to all members of a religion that viewed each member as clergy. See In re 
Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 385 n.13 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[W]e do 
not intimate that the privilege should be interpreted to comprehend 
communications to and among members of sects that denominate each and 
every member as clergy.”). 
145 See Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 792. 
146 Id. at 790 (noting that the New York statutory privilege “has its 
historical origin in the Roman Catholic church”). 
147 Id. at 792. 
148 Id. 
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professional capacity, does not lead logically to the second, that 
the privilege applies to a particular religion. Rather, the first 
point demonstrates that the privilege applies to communication 
with a particular individual who is recognized by a religious 
institution as one qualified to offer spiritual advice.149 In other 
words, the fact that the privilege would apply to qualified 
communication with a priest demonstrates the religious 
privilege’s individual applicability. Communication with a 
Catholic priest is protected, as is communication with a cleric 
within the Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim religions.150 To then 
conclude the privilege applies to Catholicism, Protestantism, 
Judaism and Islam and, therefore, must apply to A.A. without 
reference to anyone recognized by A.A. as a spiritual advisor 
converts the privilege from a principle applying individually to 
one having an organizational application. If this were true, the 
privilege would expand uncontrollably, applying not only to the 
priest, but also to the church secretary or perhaps even to 
communication between two parishioners. This not only defeats 
the limiting principle adopted by the Supreme Court in Trammel, 
but it also diminishes the authority of the fifty state legislatures, 
each of which have adopted a definition of clergy that requires 
more than a mere desire to lend a sympathetic ear.151 
                                                          
149 All of the statutory religious privileges apply to persons within 
religions, not religions categorically. See supra note 3 (citing state statutes 
conferring the religious privilege). 
150 See supra note 1 (discussing legislative attempts to enumerate the 
leaders of religions to whom the religious privilege would apply).  
151 See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1033 (Deering 2001) (defining clergy as 
“a priest, minister, religious practitioner, or similar functionary of a church or 
of a religious denomination or religious organization”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 
52-146b (2001) (limiting Connecticut’s privilege to confidential 
communication with “a clergyman, priest, minister, rabbi or practitioner of 
any religious denomination accredited by the religious body to which he 
belongs who is settled in the work of the ministry”); OR. REV. STAT. § 
40.260 (2001) (defining a clergy member as “a minister of any church, 
religious denomination or organization or accredited Christian Science 
practitioner who in the course of the discipline or practice of that church, 
denomination or organization is authorized or accustomed to hearing 
confidential communications and, under the discipline or tenets of that church, 
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Judicial interpretations of the religious privilege also support 
the notion that more is needed for a person to qualify as clergy.152 
Although they have been unwilling to identify any specific 
requirements, courts should limit the application of the religious 
                                                          
denomination or organization, has a duty to keep such communications 
secret”). 
152 In In re Verplank, a California district court found that communication 
between college students and counselors qualified for the religious privilege. 
329 F. Supp. 433, 436 (C.D. Calif. 1971). A minister ordained by the United 
Presbyterian Church who had been hired to counsel students regarding the 
Vietnam draft had recruited non-ordained counselors to assist him with what 
became an overly burdensome task. Id. at 434-36. To determine whether the 
privilege protected communication between the students and the non-ordained 
counselors, the court looked to the advisory committee’s notes for proposed 
Federal Rule of Evidence 506 and found that the non-ordained counselors’ 
work conformed sufficiently with that of an ordained minister of an 
“established Protestant denomination to the extent necessary to bring [the 
counselors] within the privilege covering communication to clergymen.” Id.; 
see also PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 7, at 84. In 
Rutledge v. State, the Supreme Court of Indiana refused to apply the privilege 
when the communication in question occurred between an inmate and a 
member of the Gideons, an organization of businessmen who passed out 
Bibles. 525 N.E.2d 326 (Ind. 1988). The Gideon member in this case 
regularly spoke with inmates about the Bible and “being forgiven for their 
sins.” Id. at 327. The makeup of the organization and the fact that it was not 
affiliated with any church were the chief factors persuading the court that the 
privilege was inapplicable. Id. at 328. The Supreme Court of Iowa, in 
Reutkemeier v. Nolte, determined that confidential communication with the 
elders of a Presbyterian church was privileged. 161 N.W. 290 (Iowa 1917). 
The elders, the court found, held a position within the church equal to that of 
the minister, who was also an elder. Id. at 292-94. Elected by the members of 
the congregation, the church elders were together responsible for governing 
the church affairs and were often called to carry out duties of the minister 
when no acknowledged minister was available. Id. at 293. These 
characteristics proved persuasive. Id. The Iowa Supreme Court later refused to 
apply the privilege to communications that transpired between a criminal 
defendant and his brother, despite the defendant’s claim that he looked to his 
brother for spiritual guidance. See State v. Alspach, 524 N.W.2d 665 (Iowa 
1994). The court found that the brother did not qualify as clergy, regardless of 
the defendant’s perceptions. Id. at 668; see also Manous v. State, 407 S.E.2d 
779, 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that a self-proclaimed psychic was not 
a member of the clergy as defined by Georgia’s religious privilege). 
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privilege to situations involving a cleric who is recognized by the 
religious organization to which that person belongs as one 
qualified to provide spiritual guidance.153 
Perhaps recognizing this, the Cox court was compelled by its 
desired outcome to determine that A.A. members are clergy.154 
Again, this conclusion ignores many of A.A.’s defining 
characteristics. The central A.A. organization recognizes no 
leaders.155 A.A. has no formal structure other than its services 
                                                          
153 See, e.g., Reutkemeier, 161 N.W. at 292-94 (examining the literature 
and doctrine of the Presbyterian Church to determine if the church viewed the 
elders as clergy to whom the religious privilege applies). Furthermore, such a 
requirement is implied by the various statutory definitions of spiritual 
advisors. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (2001) (defining “clergyman” as 
“any duly ordained, licensed or commissioned minister, pastor, priest, rabbi 
or practitioner of any bona fide established church or religious organization 
and shall include and be limited to any person who regularly, as a vocation, 
devotes a substantial portion of his time and abilities to the service of his 
respective church or religious organization”); HAW. R. EVID. 506 (2001) (“A 
member of the clergy is a minister, priest, rabbi, Christian Science 
practitioner, or other similar functionary of a religious organization . . . .”); 
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803 (2001) (defining clergy as “a clergyman or 
practitioner of any religious denomination accredited by the religious body to 
which he or she belongs”); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 2001) (requiring, 
for purposes of the religious privilege, Christian Science practitioners to be 
“duly accredited”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (2001) (prohibiting a “duly 
ordained minister of the gospel, priest, or rabbi” from revealing confidential 
communications).  
154 The Cox court’s grossly inaccurate description of A.A. and its holding 
without reasoning that A.A. members are “ordained” by the Twelve Steps 
lead to this observation. See Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); 
see also supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Cox court’s factual findings with 
respect to A.A.’s relationship with its members).  
155 See supra note 44 (stating A.A.’s ninth tradition, which allows for the 
creation of “service boards or committees”); see also The A.A. Group, 
pamphlet P-16, at 23 (Alcoholics Anonymous World Services, Inc., 1990) 
(describing the members of these committees as “officers” who are “usually . 
. . chosen by the group for limited terms of service. As Tradition Two 
reminds us, ‘Our leaders are but trusted servants; they do not govern.’ These 
jobs may have titles. But titles in A.A. do not bring authority or honor; they 
describe services and responsibilities.”). 
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board,156 no requirements for either individual members or the 
groups’ internal leaders other than the desire to recover from 
alcoholism,157 no training of any sort for anyone within the 
organization,158 and, most importantly, no recognition by the 
organization of any individual in a position to provide 
counseling, spiritual or otherwise, other than to offer personal 
experience to help guide others to sobriety.159 It is clear, 
                                                          
156 See TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 146-
49. 
157 Supra note 44 (stating A.A.’s third tradition). Although A.A. suggests 
that a member wishing to sponsor another alcoholic first attain several months 
of sobriety, there are, in fact, no requirements or restrictions with respect to 
who can become a sponsor. See Questions and Answers on Sponsorship, 
pamphlet P-15, at 10 (Alcoholics Anonymous World Services, Inc., 1983). 
“There is no superior class or caste of sponsors in A.A. Any member can help 
the newcomer learn to cope with life without resorting to alcohol in any 
form.” Id. at 13. 
158 Id. at 10.  
An A.A. sponsor does not provide any such services as those offered 
by a social worker, a doctor, a nurse, or a marriage counselor. A 
sponsor is simply a sober alcoholic who helps the newcomer solve 
one problem: how to stay sober. 
And it is not professional training that enables a sponsor to give 
help—it is just personal experience and observation. 
Id. 
159 Id. A.A. has grown through the years partly as a result of its founders’ 
belief that once A.A. members achieve sobriety, they should help others reach 
the same goal. See supra note 41 (stating A.A.’s twelfth step). This method 
evolved into what A.A. now refers to as “sponsorship.” See generally 
Questions and Answers on Sponsorship, supra note 157. A.A. describes 
sponsorship as “an alcoholic who has made some progress in the recovery 
program shar[ing] that experience on a continuous, individual basis with 
another alcoholic who is attempting to attain or maintain sobriety through 
A.A.” Id. at 7. At first glance, the support provided by a sponsor may appear 
to parallel that of a clergy member. The guidance sponsors provide, however, 
is severely curtailed by two limiting factors. Sponsors receive no formal 
training whatsoever in either alcohol recovery or spiritual matters. Id. And, 
although sponsors may share the same end—sobriety—their spiritual beliefs 
may differ greatly from those to whom they provide help, as membership 
mandates only the desire to stop drinking and does not depend on any 
particular religious beliefs. See supra note 44 (stating A.A.’s third tradition). 
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therefore, that an A.A. member is not qualified by A.A. to 
provide spiritual guidance.160 Furthermore, since A.A. 
membership requires neither sobriety nor adherence to the 
Twelve Steps, finding that A.A. members are somehow ordained 
is puzzling, to say the least.161 
The Cox decision must falter beneath the weight of appellate 
level scrutiny. Its perception of A.A. is misguided at best, as is 
its interpretation of the New York Court of Appeals’ Carmona 
decision.162 These initial misunderstandings and an obviously 
scattered rationale led the district court to ordain A.A. members, 
burdening them with an unsolicited privilege, the breadth of 
which now conflicts with Supreme Court and state legislative 
dictates.  
B. A Legal Crack in A.A.’s Foundation 
The impact the Cox decision will have on A.A. members 
should give any advocate of A.A. and similar groups cause for 
concern. First, the Cox court erects yet another barrier between 
                                                          
Sponsors are struggling with their own sobriety and are under no obligation to 
work through the Twelve Steps before sponsoring another member, though 
A.A. does encourage sponsors to first become sober. Questions and Answers 
on Sponsorship, supra note 157, at 13-14.  Yet, no matter how long a sponsor 
may be sober, A.A. recognizes that even sponsors, by the very nature of 
alcoholism, are at risk of slipping from sobriety. See, e.g., TWELVE STEPS 
AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 113-14 (discussing the danger of 
relapse that accompanies many of life’s disappointments). The organization, 
therefore, incorporates what it calls the “24-hour plan,” which reminds 
alcoholics of their powerlessness and discourages even members who have 
long been sober from making claims of future sobriety. This is AA, supra note 
50, at 14. The “24-hour plan” encourages members to focus only on staying 
sober for the next twenty-four hours. Id. 
160 A situation where an individual A.A. group looks to a particular 
member as a spiritual leader would serve as a better example of when the 
religious privilege might apply. Nonetheless, the district court in Cox did not 
limit its opinion to particular cases. See generally Cox v. Miller, 154 F. Supp. 
2d 787 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
161 TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 139. 
(“The only requirement for A.A. membership is a desire to stop drinking.”). 
162 People v. Carmona, 627 N.E.2d 959 (N.Y. 1993). 
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alcoholics and active participation in society, which is already 
complicated by the unpopular social stigma accompanying 
alcoholism.163 It accomplishes this by forcing upon them a 
“privilege” that prevents A.A. members from testifying to 
information gained within the A.A. setting and precludes law 
enforcement from utilizing any information provided voluntarily 
by A.A. members.164 Thus, A.A. members are prohibited from 
carrying out duties commonly associated with being a good 
citizen.165 Second, the court creates what some jurisdictions have 
deemed a fiduciary relationship,166 the breach of which can result 
                                                          
163  TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 184-87 
(stating that part of the reason anonymity is so important to members is a fear 
of the social stigma that might be attached); see also Understanding 
Anonymity, supra note 118, at 5-6 (discussing the need for anonymity). 
164 Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 792-93 (holding that the evidence gathered 
from the information the A.A. members provided should have been 
suppressed). 
165 See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557 (1980) (“The 
citizen’s duty to raise the hue and cry and report felonies to the authorities was 
an established tenet of Anglo-Saxon law at least as early as the 13th 
Century.”) (internal quotations omitted); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 
53, 59 (1957) (noting that the government’s ability to conceal an informer’s 
identity is necessary in light of citizens’ duty “to communicate their 
knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials”); United 
States v. Jefferson, 252 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[C]itizens have an 
obligation to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law 
enforcement officials.”); Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1020 (11th 
Cir. 1987) (noting “the duty that is imposed upon all citizens to report 
criminal activity”); United States v. Cowan, 396 F.2d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(“It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever 
information they may have to aid in law enforcement.”) (quoting Miranda v. 
State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966)) (internal quotations omitted). 
But see United States v. Zimmerman, 943 F.2d 1204, 1214 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(“It is well established that a person who sees a crime being committed has no 
legal duty to either stop it or report it.”). 
166 See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 626 (6th ed. 1990) (defining 
“fiduciary or confidential relation” as broadly “embracing . . . technical 
fiduciary relations and . . . informal relations which exist wherever one person 
trusts in or relies upon another” and stating that “[s]uch relationship arises 
whenever confidence is reposed on one side, and domination and influence 
result on the other; the relation can be legal, social, domestic, or merely 
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in civil liability.167 Consequently, the Cox court has determined 
                                                          
personal”). 
167 By determining that A.A. members are clergy, the Cox court also sets 
a precedent for other jurisdictions to impose civil liability on either A.A. 
members whose breach of confidentiality is considered a breach of a fiduciary 
duty or possibly on A.A. itself. See, e.g., Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman 
Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 430-32 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding the 
trial court’s finding of a fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and the 
Diocese and holding that the First Amendment does not bar claims against 
religious organizations for breach of fiduciary duties); Sanders v. Casa View 
Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 338 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that the First 
Amendment does not bar claims against clergy for either malpractice or breach 
of fiduciary duties); Doe v. Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1061-62 (N.D. Iowa 
1999) (stating that whether a spiritual counselor has a legally cognizable 
fiduciary duty “depends upon factual circumstances, not upon professional 
standards of conduct for the average reasonable member of the clergy” and 
holding that breach of fiduciary duty claims against clergy are not “barred ab 
initio” ). 
 Although these cases arise in the context of claims of sexual abuse, at 
least one court has acknowledged the possibility of a duty arising from a 
breach of confidentiality. See F.G. v. MacDonnell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997). 
The plaintiff in F.G. brought claims against a church rector and his assistant. 
Id. at 699-700. Like the courts above, the claim against the church rector 
arose from allegations of sexual misconduct. Id. at 700. The claim against the 
rector’s assistant, also a member of the clergy, however, concerned a letter he 
published detailing the facts of the relationship between the plaintiff and the 
rector and circulated to the members of the congregation. Id. The plaintiff 
claimed she had revealed the details to the assistant rector in confidence. Id. at 
701. The court held that, generally, the First Amendment does not bar a claim 
against a clergy member for breach of fiduciary duties. Id. at 703. Thus, the 
court upheld the claim against the rector for breach of fiduciary duties with 
respect to the sexual relationship. Id. at 705. Furthermore, the F.G. court held 
that the claim against the assistant for breach of confidentiality would stand if 
the trial court could determine the existence of a breach by referring to 
nonreligious, “neutral principles.” Id. But see Lann v. Davis, 793 So. 2d 463, 
465-66 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a claim against a clergy member for 
breach of fiduciary duty equated to a claim for clergy malpractice and, as 
such, was barred by First Amendment); Teadt v. Lutheran Church Mo. 
Synod, 603 N.W.2d 816, 822-24 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to create a 
fiduciary duty for clergy, stating that such a duty would be impossible to 
define); Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E.2d 1027, 1032 (N.Y. 2001) (holding 
that New York’s religious privilege did not create a fiduciary duty); Langford 
v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 705 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (N.Y. App. 
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that alcoholic criminals who wish to unburden their souls have a 
greater right to recover from their affliction than do those 
alcoholics in whom the criminals wish to confide. Cox allows 
alcoholics to reveal their criminal secrets to fellow alcoholics 
who might not be psychologically capable of maintaining a 
relationship requiring confidentiality.168 This could prove 
instrumental to recovering criminals, whose unburdened 
consciences are free to focus on remaining sober, yet detrimental 
to recovering confidants.169 Thus, Cox turns on its head the 
principle that those who fail to live by society’s standards 
sacrifice their interests in freedom to forward the interests of the 
                                                          
Div. 2000) (holding that the First Amendment barred claims against clergy for 
breach of fiduciary duties, which the court equated to malpractice); Hawkins 
v. Trinity Baptist Church, 30 S.W.3d 446, 453 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding that 
the First Amendment barred courts from establishing a fiduciary duty owed by 
clergy members). 
168 See Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 790. The facts of Cox demonstrate the 
plausibility of an A.A. confidant who is unable to carry the burden of 
confidentiality encouraged by A.A. Id. Ms. H, struggling with what Mr. Cox 
had told her, felt compelled to reveal the information to her own psychologist. 
Id. Thus, it follows that if the criminal A.A. member divulges criminal secrets 
to a non-criminal A.A. member precluded by law from revealing this 
information, the criminal A.A. member is, arguably, benefited by 
unburdening his soul while the non-criminal A.A. member must bear the 
weight of harboring knowledge of the confessor’s crimes. See generally Julie 
D. Lane & Daniel M. Wegner, The Cognitive Consequences of Secrecy, 69 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 237 (1995) (discussing the psychological 
effects of harboring secrets). 
169 As if overcoming alcoholism were not difficult enough, the confidant 
struggling with her own sobriety now must either sacrifice her civic duty to 
disclose criminal activity or face potential civil liability should she be unable 
to carry out the duty created by Cox. See supra note 167 (discussing decisions 
finding a clergy fiduciary duty). Such a psychological dilemma may well 
undermine the recovering alcoholic’s sobriety. See, e.g., Brady & Sonne, 
supra note 125; Sandra A. Brown et al., Severity of Psychosocial Stress and 
Outcome of Alcoholism Treatment, 99 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 344, 344-48 
(1990) (distinguishing between the effects of severe and mild stress on the 
ability of the alcoholic to remain abstinent and finding, inter alia, that 
alcoholics who relapsed after treatment had experienced more severe stress 
than the subjects who did not relapse); McKay, supra note 125, at 566.  
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non-criminals in attaining a crime-free society.170 Public policy 
cannot support the proposition that criminals have a superior 
interest in sobriety than non-criminals.171 
By expanding the religious privilege to communication within 
A.A., the Cox court usurped the A.A. member’s control over her 
own recovery.172 If Cox is persuasive,  A.A. members in 
jurisdictions recognizing a spiritual advisor’s fiduciary 
relationship will no longer decide for themselves whether to 
maintain the confidential relationships encouraged by A.A.173 
Largely as a result of A.A.’s unwillingness to apply pressure to 
its members and its support of individual autonomy,174 A.A.’s 
methods have been “extremely successful internationally, 
[resulting in] more than a million members in the United States 
alone.”175  Now, the responsibility to maintain confidentiality has 
been forced upon them by a decision that is overly confident in 
an alcoholic’s ability to maintain both confidentiality and 
sobriety. 
A person afflicted with the disease of alcoholism always risks 
                                                          
170 Imprisonment is a key method for protecting society from those who 
commit criminal acts. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Jail Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/jails.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 
2002) (stating that the nation’s local jails held 621,149 prisoners in mid-2000); 
see also Dep’t of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison Statistics, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj. gov/bjs/prisons.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2002) (stating 
that as of December 31, 2000, 1,381,892 prisoners were under the control of 
the federal or state prison systems).   
171 Were this not true, the criminal justice system would transmogrify; for 
if criminals have a greater interest in sobriety, it follows that they have a 
superior interest in liberty as well. See supra note 170 (stating the number of 
criminals being held in local jails and state and federal prisons). 
172 See supra Part II.A (discussing A.A.’s relationship with its members).  
173 See supra note 167 (discussing cases finding a fiduciary duty for 
clergy).  
174 TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 173 
(“Neither its General Service Conference, its foundation board, nor the 
humblest group committee can issue a single directive to an A.A. member and 
make it stick, let alone mete out any punishment.”).  
175 Cox v. Miller, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787, 789 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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drinking again.176 Medical studies on alcoholism have shown that 
stress is a major factor contributing to a recovering alcoholic’s 
slip from sobriety.177 Of course, every alcoholic is different. 
Some may be able to handle a lot of stress.178 Others may slip 
easily from sobriety as the result of simple, day-to-day 
pressures.179 The act of keeping a secret itself may serve as the 
proverbial straw.180 The law has now determined that all 
alcoholics within A.A. are capable of coping with the stress of 
knowing and not being able to reveal that a fellow member has 
committed atrocities for which they have not been held 
accountable.181 Prior to Cox, A.A. encouraged confidentiality but 
never guaranteed it; therefore confidentiality could never be 
                                                          
176 See, e.g., Billie Jay Sahley & Katherine M. Birkner, Alcoholism and 
Its Treatment, TOWNSEND LETTER FOR DOCTORS AND PATIENTS, July 1, 2000, 
at 62 (“The greatest majority of alcoholics cannot become social drinkers 
again because they tend to relapse into heavy drinking.”). 
177 See Brady & Sonne, supra note 125; Brown et al., supra note 169; 
McKay, supra note 125. 
178 See Brady & Sonne, supra note 125. 
179 See id. 
180 See Lane & Wegner, supra note 168, at 239. 
Thought suppression and intrusive thoughts occur cyclically, each in 
response to the other. Secrecy sets the stage for the formation of a 
feedback system in which each attempt to suppress the secret 
produces intrusive thinking of that very secret, which in turn 
engenders increased efforts at thought suppression. This process can 
quickly turn into a self-sustaining cycle in which obsessive 
preoccupation with thoughts of the secret develops. Once this 
preoccupation cycle is set into motion, moreover, removing secrecy 
from the equation will not necessarily stop the obsessive 
preoccupation with the secret. After the person has identified the 
thought of a secret as intrusive and unwanted, suppression can 
maintain the intrusiveness (and the intrusiveness can maintain the 
suppression). Secrecy’s cognitive consequences may persevere long 
after the secrecy itself is gone. 
Id.  
181  Supra note 168 (discussing the potential psychological impact the Cox 
decision could have on non-criminal alcoholics attempting to recover through 
A.A.). 
BARRYMACRO7-11FINAL.DOC 7/24/02  11:13 AM 
478 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
reasonably expected.182 That fact by itself should preclude 
expanding the religious privilege to A.A.183 
The law now, in effect, demands that members of A.A. 
guarantee confidentiality and, as a result, has determined that the 
criminal’s interest in sobriety supercedes that of the non-criminal 
A.A. member.184 Public policy cannot tolerate such a distortion 
of the legal system. It is also quite possible that A.A., as it has 
existed since 1939, will be unable to tolerate the pressure now 
being applied as a matter of law. This result would certainly 
prove harmful to society’s interests, contravening both utilitarian 
principles185 and Supreme Court precedent.186 Applying the 
                                                          
182 Not only would the Constitution leave the law powerless to force a 
religion to guarantee confidentiality, but the fact that a person in such a 
situation could have no expectation of confidentiality also would mandate 
against applying the religious privilege, which requires just such an 
expectation. See United States v. Wells, 446 F.2d 2, 4 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(upholding the trial court’s decision to admit into evidence an inmate’s letter to 
a priest when the letter contained no indication that it was meant to remain 
confidential). 
183 Although the parameters of the privilege vary somewhat from state to 
state, each statute granting the privilege requires an expectation of 
confidentiality. See supra note 3 (listing the state statutes). 
184 See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.  
185 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 
1990) (“[T]he privilege protecting communications to members of the clergy, 
like the attorney-client and physician-patient privileges, is grounded in a policy 
of preventing disclosures that would tend to inhibit the development of 
confidential relationships that are socially desirable.”); see also J.S. MILL, 
UTILITARIANISM 55 (Roger Crisp ed., Oxford University Press 1998) (1863) 
(“The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest 
Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to 
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.”). 
In his introductory analysis of Mill’s work, Roger Crisp summarizes the 
Greatest Happiness Principle by explaining that “the ultimate end is the 
greatest balance of pleasure over pain, to be assessed by competent judges. 
This being the end of human action, it is also the end of morality, which 
consists of those rules that will best further the end.” Id. at 37. John Henry 
Wigmore’s four criteria for protecting confidential communications, discussed 
infra Part III, which have been applied in numerous jurisdictions, are 
described as utilitarian. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Miss., Inc. v. 
Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. 1981) (“This Court adopted Wigmore’s 
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religious privilege to A.A. communication, therefore, is 
unsupported by both law and public policy. 
III. RESPONDING TO CRITICS 
Supporters of expanding the religious privilege to A.A. 
generally invoke Dean Wigmore’s criteria for recognizing an 
evidentiary privilege.187 They also argue that A.A. members 
essentially function as clergy and, therefore, deserve similar 
treatment.188 Finally, some have expressed concern that without 
the protection of the religious privilege A.A. will suffer by 
becoming an easily accessible law enforcement tool.189 While this 
                                                          
classic utilitarian formulation of the conditions for recognition of a testimonial 
privilege in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).”); 
Marshall v. Spectrum Med. Group, 198 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D. Me. 2000) (stating 
that when determining whether information is privileged “this court must 
consider Wigmore’s classic utilitarian formulation”); see also Developments in 
the Law: Privileged Communications: II. Modes of Analysis: The Theories and 
Justifications of Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1472 
(1985) (describing Wigmore’s criteria as “essentially utilitarian” and 
describing the utilitarian approach as “assert[ing] that communications made 
within a given relation should be privileged only if the benefit derived from 
protecting the relation outweighs the detrimental effect of the privilege on the 
search for truth”). Wigmore was dean of faculty at Northwestern University 
School of Law from 1901 to 1929. WILLIAM R. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY 
WIGMORE 45-184 (1977). His treatise on evidence, which laid the foundation 
for modern evidentiary law, was first published in 1904 and “was promptly 
recognized as an outstanding publication . . . .” Id. at 77. “[A]nd Wigmore 
quickly rose from the rank of a promising but somewhat obscure scholar and 
teacher to the rating of one of the great masters of the law.” Id. at 79 (inner 
quotations omitted). 
186 See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 
40 (1980)). 
187 See generally Reed, supra note 30; Weiner, supra note 30. 
188 See generally Reed, supra note 30; Weiner, supra note 30. 
189 See Jimmy Breslin, Without a Shield, A.A. May Not Survive, 
NEWSDAY, June 14, 1994, at A2 (quoting an A.A. member, identified only as 
a priest, as stating after Mr. Cox’s conviction, “As I understand it, they 
subpoenaed people for a double homicide. That’s rare. But once you make 
Alcoholics Anonymous people talk about one thing, what is to stop the 
authorities from deciding that they can come around for anything, an income 
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fear is not entirely irrational, expanding the religious privilege is 
excessive and ultimately unnecessary in light of the constitutional 
protection afforded all religious organizations. 
A.  Dean Wigmore’s Criteria Fail to Support Protecting A.A. 
Communication 
Dean Wigmore identified four criteria he viewed as necessary 
to establish an evidentiary privilege: 
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence 
that they will not be disclosed. 
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the 
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between 
the parties. 
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the 
community ought to be sedulously fostered. 
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the 
disclosure of the communications must be greater than the 
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of 
litigation.190 
In the A.A. context, however, attempting to apply the four 
criteria requires a level of speculation that could not be tolerated 
in light of the public policy argument discussed in Part II. First, 
whether an expectation of confidentiality can exist within A.A. is 
highly uncertain.191 The organization imposes no consequences on 
                                                          
tax case.”). Another rationale proffered is that the information conveyed in 
A.A. and similar self-help settings is protected by the penumbral right to 
privacy. See Reed, supra note 30, at 746-51; Weiner, supra note 30, at 267-
70. 
190 8 J.H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285 
(McNaughton rev. 1961). 
191 As has already been noted, A.A. has no authority over its members, 
who are free to follow or dismiss A.A.’s suggestions. See TWELVE STEPS AND 
TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 173. “Groups have tried to expel 
members, but the banished have come back to sit in the meeting place, saying 
‘This is life for us; you can’t keep us out.’” Id. Nowhere in the Twelve Steps 
or Twelve Traditions is the word or concept of confidentiality mentioned.  See 
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individuals for failing to follow its suggestion that communication 
be considered confidential.192 Nor should society assume that 
alcoholics, by attending A.A. meetings, are willing to subject 
themselves to the responsibilities that accompany the confidential 
relationship.193 
Next, it is unclear whether the expectation of confidentiality 
is necessary for the relationships within A.A. to survive. 
Although some evidence suggests that people are more honest 
when guaranteed confidentiality, A.A. has never guaranteed 
confidentiality;194 therefore, it cannot be argued that a lack of 
such a guarantee would negatively affect A.A.’s membership or 
effectiveness.195 In fact, it is equally reasonable to assume that the 
members of A.A. require and relish the freedom from the 
responsibility of having to harbor the knowledge of the criminal 
deeds of another.196 The founders of A.A. recognized the need to 
not pressure the alcoholic.197 The law, far less knowledgeable in 
such matters, is in no position to determine otherwise. 
Regarding the fourth criterion, prohibiting A.A. members 
                                                          
supra note 41 (listing A.A.’s Twelve Steps); see also supra note 44 (listing 
A.A.’s Twelve Traditions). 
192 TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 173. 
193 See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing A.A.’s relationship with its 
members). 
194 See supra note 191 (discussing A.A.’s lack of authority over its 
members); see also Alcoholics Anonymous, The Importance of Anonymity, at 
http://www.alcoholics-anonymous.org/english/E_FactFile/M-24_d9.html (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2002) (“An A.A. member may, for various reasons, ‘break 
anonymity’ deliberately at the public level. Since this is a matter of individual 
choice and conscience, the Fellowship as a whole obviously has no control 
over such deviations from tradition.”). 
195 Furthermore, there is equally compelling evidence that some secrets 
are better unrevealed. See Anita E. Kelly & Kevin J. McKillop, Consequences 
of Revealing Personal Secrets, 120 PSYCHOL. BULL., No. 3, 450-65 (stating 
that revealing secrets, which is largely considered therapeutically beneficial, 
may actually damage the confessor when the secret revealed causes the 
confidant to react negatively). 
196 See supra note 191 (discussing A.A.’s lack of authority over its 
members).  
197 See Twelve STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 129 
(stating that A.A. has no rules). 
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from revealing knowledge of criminal behavior would actually 
prove harmful to recovering alcoholics, who may be emotionally 
unable to handle the burden the religious privilege places on 
them. The privilege, therefore, actually injures those the Cox 
court may have been trying to protect. Any injury that may result 
to the personal relationship between A.A. members can hardly 
compare. Compounded with the barrier evidentiary privileges 
place between courts and the truth they seek, it is difficult to see 
any benefits arising from imposing the religious privilege on 
A.A. members. 
Ultimately, the third criterion is the only one that survives 
analysis. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to argue that 
A.A. does not benefit society. Although A.A. keeps no detailed 
records of membership, the organization claims to have millions 
of members throughout the world.198 Alcoholism is a source of 
crime, misery, and physical illness that can lead to self-
destruction and death.199 Likewise, alcoholism poses enormous 
economic costs on society.200 Because A.A. reduces those costs 
while imposing no realizable social costs of its own, society 
should “sedulously foster[]” A.A. and the relationships that 
develop therein.201 Nevertheless, the satisfaction of this criterion 
alone cannot justify applying the religious privilege to 
communications within A.A.202 
                                                          
198 See supra note 25 (noting A.A.’s size in terms of members). 
199 See Jill Neimark et al., Back from the Drink, PSYCHOL.TODAY, Sept. 
1994, at 46 (stating that in the United States each year, 40,000 people die 
from alcoholism and that alcoholism is implicated in 30% of suicides overall 
and 46% of suicides among teenagers). 
200 Id. (stating that the monetary costs to the country are $80 billion 
annually). 
201 Id.; see also J.H. WIGMORE, supra note 190, at § 2285. 
202 J.H. WIGMORE, supra note 190, at § 2285. 
Only if these four conditions are present should a privilege be 
recognized. That they are present in most of the recognized privileges 
is plain enough; and the absence of one or more of them serves to 
explain why certain privileges have failed to obtain the recognition 
sometimes demanded for them. 
Id.  
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B.  Courts Do Not Adhere to the Functionalist Approach203 
Commentators also argue that the religious privilege should 
apply to A.A. based on the purpose A.A. members serve each 
other.204 Since A.A. members provide essentially the same 
service as clergy members, the argument goes, A.A. members 
should enjoy a similar right to privileged communication.205 In 
addition to the myriad reasons why A.A. members are not the 
equivalent of clergy,206 the functionalist approach, in light of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Trammel, suffers from a more obvious 
deficiency—the proverbial slippery slope. That is to say, 
accompanying the functionalist rationale is the potential for 
burdensome litigation seeking to further expand the privilege. 
For example, litigants have already tried to argue—
unsuccessfully—that the religious privilege applies to a psychic or 
to family members to whom a person may look for spiritual 
guidance.207 If the religious privilege did apply to such 
relationships, one could then argue, for example, that the lawyer-
client privilege should apply to a criminal seeking legal advice 
from a bail bondsman. Such arguments would burden the courts 
tremendously by forcing them to create exceptions in order to 
administer justice, when, as Trammel clarifies, the administration 
of justice is the rule and protected communication the 
                                                          
203 See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 68, at 734 
(defining “Functionalism” as follows: “(1) The doctrine that the function of an 
object should determine its design and materials; (2) A doctrine stressing 
purpose, practicality, and utility.”).  
204 See Reed, supra note 30, at 737 (analogizing A.A. members and 
clergy); Weiner, supra note 30, at 270-72 (discussing “the functionalist 
rationale” for extending the religious privilege to A.A.). 
205 See supra note 204 (citing commentators proffering this view).  
206 See supra Part II.4 (distinguishing A.A. members from members of 
the clergy).  
207 See Manous v. State, 407 S.E.2d 779, 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) 
(holding that the religious privilege did not apply to communication between a 
criminal defendant and his psychic); State v. Alspach, 524 N.W.2d 665, 668 
(Iowa 1994) (holding that a criminal defendant’s brother did not qualify as 
clergy despite defendant’s view of his brother as a spiritual advisor). 
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exception.208 
C.  Extending the Privilege Is Unnecessary 
Finally, creating explicit legal protection for speech within 
A.A., although already shown to violate public policy, is a 
drastic and unnecessary solution to a problem not yet proven to 
exist. In addition to the utilitarian and functionalist positions 
discussed,209 some believe that the Cox trial exemplifies the abuse 
that will result without the privilege.210 Although Ms. H 
voluntarily approached the district attorney to reveal the 
information Mr. Cox had told her, the others within Mr. Cox’s 
A.A. group were forced to testify.211 Critics arguing for 
application of the religious privilege to A.A. claim that such a 
measure is necessary to prevent prosecutors from abusing their 
position by subpoenaing A.A. members and compromising A.A. 
confidentiality.212 Yet, in their haste, these critics forget about 
Ms. H and other A.A. members whose dedication to maintaining 
the confidential relationships encouraged by A.A. is secondary to 
their psychological well-being.213 Furthermore, the six-and-a-
half-year interim between Mr. Cox’s conviction, which was 
reported nationwide,214 and his grant of habeas corpus offered no 
                                                          
208 See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 
40 (1980)). 
209 See supra Parts III.A-B (discussing and dismissing the various 
rationales for extending the religious privilege to communication within 
A.A.). 
210 See supra note 189 (noting the alarmist concern that failure to protect 
communication within A.A. will result in the organization’s demise).   
211 See Reed, supra note 30, at 700 (stating that the Cox conviction was 
the first incident where A.A. members were compelled to testify). 
212 See supra note 189 (noting the alarmist concern that failure to protect 
communication within A.A. will result in the organization’s demise). 
213 Cox v. Miller, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787, at 790 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating 
that Ms. H first revealed to her psychologist the information Mr. Cox had told 
her). 
214 See, e.g., Geraldine Baum, Whether in a Support Group, Therapy or 
Church, People Seek Comfort in Anonymous Confession, L.A. TIMES, June 
24, 1994, at E1; Editorial, Confidentiality Not Guaranteed in All Kinds of 
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indication that the critics’ concerns of overzealous, encroaching 
prosecutors are remotely realistic.215 
Nevertheless, the possibility of a situation like Cox arising 
again is not beyond comprehension, and the social benefits A.A. 
confers certainly weigh in favor of protecting those A.A. 
members who view confidentiality as fundamental to their 
recovery.216 Clearly, extending the religious privilege to A.A. 
risks compromising the spirit of freedom and autonomy ingrained 
in nearly every aspect of one of the world’s most successful self-
help organizations.217 Conversely, absent the privilege, A.A. 
members remain free from the pressures the privilege creates, 
free to focus on becoming and remaining sober and, if they so 
choose, free to preserve the confidential, anonymous 
relationships encouraged by A.A.218 Assuming the Second and 
Seventh Circuit decisions recognizing twelve step programs as 
religious organizations are upheld and found persuasive 
elsewhere,219 the Constitution will protect A.A. members from 
abusive law enforcement.220 
                                                          
Therapy Sessions, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 18, 1994, at 14A; Bruce 
Frankel, Drunken Stupor Turns Deadly/A.A. Confession Raises Questions of 
Confidentiality, USA TODAY, June 8, 1994, at 2A; Jan Hoffman, Faith in 
Confidentiality of Therapy Is Shaken, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1994, at A1. 
215  See Reed, supra note 30, at 700 (stating that the Cox conviction was 
the first incident where A.A. members were compelled to testify). Research 
has thus far uncovered no other cases where A.A. members were forced to 
testify or where law enforcement officials were accused of infiltrating A.A. 
meetings. 
216 See supra Part III.A (discussing Dean Wigmore’s criteria for 
establishing an evidentiary privilege). 
217 See supra Part I.A (discussing the history of A.A.). 
218 See supra note 118 (discussing the theory behind A.A.’s principle of 
anonymity). 
219 See Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir. 
1996); Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996). 
220  See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 
450 U.S. 707, 718 (“The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by 
showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling 
state interest.”); see also, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-35 (1972) 
(holding that the state could not compel defendants, Amish parents, to send 
their children to school past the eighth grade when such practice violated their 
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The Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution prevents courts 
from compelling A.A. members to testify with respect to 
information revealed in the practice of their “religion.”221 This is 
true to the extent that the government has no compelling interest 
and cannot accomplish its ends through a means tailored to 
protect fundamental First Amendment rights.222 In Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, the Supreme Court stated, “Only those interests of the 
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance 
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”223 Relying on 
the Constitution will not only protect A.A. members in a fashion 
similar to the religious privilege, but it also will protect those 
A.A. members who long to be free from the restraints the 
religious privilege imposes.224 
                                                          
religious beliefs). 
221 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see supra note 53 (discussing cases equating 
A.A. with religion).  
222 See supra note 220 (citing cases discussing government infringement 
of the free exercise of religion). 
223 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. 
224 Obviously, not every member is dedicated to the principle of 
confidentiality within A.A. That is not to say that no A.A. members adhere to 
a self-imposed obligation to maintain the confidential relationship out of a 
belief that it is fundamental to the practice of A.A.’s Twelve Steps and Twelve 
Traditions. In Thomas, the Supreme Court addressed a similar situation. 450 
U.S. 707. The plaintiff in Thomas was a Jehovah’s Witness who had been 
employed in the steel industry. Id. at 710. Originally, he had been involved in 
the fabrication of sheet steel. Id. But when the company he worked for closed 
his division, Mr. Thomas was transferred to a division requiring him to 
participate in the manufacturing of tank turrets for the military. Id. According 
to Mr. Thomas, his religion would not permit him to contribute directly to the 
manufacture of armaments, though he felt that he could be involved in the 
production of materials that may find their way to military use more 
indirectly. Id. at 711. Not all within his religion were in agreement. Id. at 
710. A fellow Jehovah’s Witness had told Mr. Thomas that working on 
weapons did not violate his religion’s doctrine. Id. Mr. Thomas was 
nonetheless convinced, and his convictions caused him to ask to be laid off. 
Id. When this request was refused, he quit and sought unemployment benefits. 
Id. The matter found its way to the Supreme Court of Indiana, which held that 
a denial of benefits did not violate the Free Exercise Clause when the belief 
claimed to have been infringed was nothing more than a “personal 
philosophical choice.” Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although the Cox opinion will not likely be affirmed on 
appeal and Mr. Cox will remain in prison to pay for his crimes, 
the district court’s bewildering decision provides a glimpse of 
what the future may hold for A.A. and other groups adopting the 
Twelve Steps. The legal system seems increasingly intent on 
viewing A.A. as a sectarian organization.225 While the Warner 
and Farrey decisions arguably are the grossest examples of the 
establishment of religion, they seem less so when confined to 
their facts.226 Although the Second Circuit in Warner 
distinguished between the religious events at A.A. and a prayer 
at a high school graduation, it would be wise for the court to 
readdress this aspect and reconsider its position.227 Analogizing 
A.A. meetings that incorporate religious aspects with a public 
school attempting to incorporate a prayer would result in less 
confusion while reaching the identical end sought, preventing the 
government from endorsing religion in the broadest sense of the 
                                                          
Div., 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1131 (Ind. 1979). Reversing the Indiana court’s 
decision, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that it was not necessary for Mr. 
Thomas’ belief to comport with the beliefs of other Jehovah’s Witnesses for 
his belief to rise to a religious status. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715, 716. 
Intrafaith differences of that kind are not uncommon among followers 
of a particular creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill 
equipped to resolve such differences in relation to the Religion 
Clauses. One can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so 
clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection 
under the Free Exercise Clause; but that is not the case here, and the 
guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by 
all of the members of a religious sect. 
Id. 
225 See supra Part I.B (discussing the gradual judicial perception of A.A. 
as a religious organization despite A.A.’s contrary position and its provision 
of interpretive guidance for atheist members). 
226 See Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir. 
1996); Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996). 
227 Warner, 115 F.3d at 1076 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 
(1992), which found that non-sectarian prayer given at a public high school 
graduation violated the Establishment Clause). 
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word.228 
Whether the Second or Seventh Circuits do ultimately limit 
their views on this issue, the fact remains that the religious 
privilege is inapplicable in the A.A. context.229 Although the 
courts may choose to maintain the view that A.A. is a religion, it 
should be viewed as a religion without recognized leaders or 
spiritual advisors.230 In light of congressional and Supreme Court 
limitations on the development of evidentiary privileges and 
common sense reading of state religious privileges, unless the 
various legislatures decide otherwise, protecting communication 
within A.A. should be left to the Constitution’s Free Exercise 
Clause. The Cox court chose to ignore Congress and the Supreme 
Court, and its application of New York law was disingenuous, to 
say the least. Furthermore, its effects could be disastrous for the 
millions of people whose very survival depends on A.A. The Cox 
opinion should, therefore, serve the legal community not as a 
persuasive argument or precedent, but as a mistake not to be 
repeated. 
 
                                                          
228 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 589 (“The First Amendment’s Religion Clauses 
mean that religious beliefs and religious expression are too precious to be 
either proscribed or prescribed by the State.”). 
229 See supra Parts II-III (discussing the numerous reasons why the 
religious privilege should not be extended to communication within A.A.).  
230 See supra Part II.A.4 (distinguishing between A.A. members and 
members of the clergy).  
